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The future of peace and security in outer space is at a critical juncture.  The legal regime 
that guides commercial, military and scientific activities in space is fragmented and increasingly 
inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the growing number of actors seeking to exploit 
space.  The most serious challenge to the space regime is posed by the stated intent of the present 
administration of the United States to pursue national dominance in space, which may eventually 
include stationing weapons there.  Although space is already militarized to some degree, that is, 
used for military support purposes, no nation has yet placed weapons in space.  Such a move 
would cross an important and longstanding threshold, likely provoking a battle for national 
superiority in space dominated by the United States.  It would seriously undermine the current 
legal order in space widely supported by the rest of the world.  The deployment of ground-based 
antisatellite weapons would also constitute a serious departure from the current regime. Without 
a concerted effort to develop a more comprehensive legal regime for space that will limit 
unconstrained weaponization, the international community will likely face a new military 
competition in space, with destabilizing consequences for national and global security.  Such a 
competition will place at risk existing military, commercial, and scientific activities in space.   
 
With events of September 11, 2001, and the war against Iraq dominating the headlines, 
the issue of national missile defense, and with it the larger issue of the control and weaponization 
of space, have receded from the front pages.  However, the problem is imminent as the United 
States moves forward with Pentagon plans to develop “space control” and “global engagement” 
capabilities, which imply the deployment of weapons in space.  If conflict over the use of space, 
or even actual conflict in space, is to be prevented or at least significantly constrained by general 
agreement, the international community will need to agree on permitted activity in space and 
more refined arrangements for distributing the benefits of that activity.  Such a regime would be 
in the strong interest of commercial, scientific and military support constituencies worldwide.  
Without such agreement, space will largely be shaped by the short-term interests of power rather 
than the long-term interests of law.   
 
This paper develops the case for a more refined, rule-based regime for outer space.  In the 
first part of the paper, I describe the current challenge to the space regime posed by U.S. pursuit 
of national dominance in space.  After summarizing the current legal regime in space, I outline 
three alternative scenarios for the future of space—national dominance, “muddling through,” and 
a strengthened legal regime—and argue why the first two are unlikely to lead to stable outcomes 
over the long haul.  In the second part of the paper, I make the case for a strengthened, rule-based 
regime for space organized around new guiding principles.  Despite the persistence of the 
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traditional “high seas” analogy for outer space, it is no longer an adequate basis for rulemaking 
for space.  This analogy and its associated principle, “freedom of the seas,” are often used by 
advocates of space weapons to defend U.S. dominance in space and the stationing of weapons 
there.  Yet their use of this concept is highly simplistic.  “Freedom of the seas” has taken on the 
aura of a sacred mantra, but in actual practice it has been a controversial principle that has been 
increasingly circumscribed in ocean law since 1945.  A close examination of the “freedom of the 
seas” analogy reveals its weaknesses as a basis for rulemaking in space.  Instead, alternative 
principles and models are needed.  The evolution of the Law of the Sea Treaty provides some 
useful insights about both the multilateral lawmaking process and new principles that might be 
used in developing a more specified legal regime for space. 
 
The Current Challenge:  Law versus Power in Outer Space   
 
 The dominant challenge to the future of space lies in the existence of two competing 
visions of how activities in space should be organized, managed, and controlled.  The first view 
emphasizes the central role of law in preserving space for “peaceful purposes” and in promoting 
international cooperation in the use and exploitation of space for the benefit of all. This view 
emphasizes the benefits of a multilateral legal regime as the best way to balance the various 
interests in space, to manage the possible interference of activities, and to ensure that no single 
power predominates to possibly jeopardize access to space by others.  Power is constrained by 
law, and national interests are pursued in the context of a developed and articulated legal 
framework and an assumption of mutual and reciprocal interests.  This is the logic of the current 
legal regime for space (however weak and incomplete), as reflected in a set of outer space, arms 
control, and commercial treaties and agreements beginning in the 1960s. 
 
The second view is the logic of national dominance projected by the former U.S. Space 
Command (SPACECOM).7  With the United States increasingly reliant on space for both 
commercial and military support activities, SPACECOM argues that U.S. assets in space are 
vulnerable to attack and that in order to protect them the United States needs to dominate space 
militarily.  SPACECOM’s Vision for 2020 (1997) argues that the protection of space requires 
superior U.S. space warfare capability and proclaims its members "stewards for military space.”  
It sets out two principal themes:  1) dominating the space dimension of military operations to 
protect U.S. interests and investment, and 2) integrating space forces into warfighting 
capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict.8  As Air Force General Joseph W. Ashy, a 
former commander of SPACECOM, explained, the United States “will engage terrestrial targets 
someday—ships, airplanes, land targets—from space.  We will engage targets in space, from 
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space....[The] missions are already assigned, and we’ve written the concepts of operations.”9 
SPACECOM also claims that the United States has to establish a military presence in space in 
order to preempt possible efforts by other nations to do so.  
 
Although this was once purely SPACECOM doctrine, prominent civilian defense 
officials have endorsed the global engagement strategy, and have begun to implement changes in 
Pentagon doctrine, organization and budgets to move in that direction. The January 2001 
Rumsfeld Commission report on the management of U.S. space assets, produced by a study 
commission chaired by Donald Rumsfeld before he became secretary of defense, signaled his 
strong support for the need to project force in space to counter presumed threats to U.S. military 
security there.15  Although it stopped short of directly advocating space weapons, no one could 
miss the point.  In late September 2001, the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Report, a wide-ranging 
assessment of U.S defense policy, called for beefing up military space surveillance, 
communications, and other applications of earth-orbiting spacecraft.  It also underscored the 
need to deny use of space by adversaries, and that U.S. vulnerabilities in space must be met with 
aggressive development of space capabilities.16 
 
Most tellingly, the Department of Defense’s Nuclear Posture Review, portions of which 
were leaked in March 2002, reportedly advocates the use of space-based assets to enhance 
conventional and nuclear strike capabilities.  In October 2002, SPACECOM merged with the 
U.S. Strategic Command, which controls U.S. nuclear forces, to create a single entity responsible 
for early warning, missile defense, and long-range strikes.17  The Pentagon has requested $1.6 
billion dollars over FY 2003-2007 to develop space-based lasers and kinetic kill vehicles to 
intercept and destroy ballistic missiles (as well as to destroy satellites).18  Providing further 
evidence of high-level support for the global engagement strategy, the Bush administration’s 
decision to withdraw from the 30-year old Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty appeared to be 
less a necessary move driven by technical needs of missile defense testing (since much testing 
could be done within the terms of the treaty, and deployment of a feasible system is not 
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imminent) than a symbolic move to sweep away inconvenient legal obstacles to U.S. power 
projection in space.19 
This vision of national dominance, the rest of the world, and especially China, contends, 
is incompatible with the established legal regime in space.20  The international community has 
for over forty years repeatedly reaffirmed that space should be preserved for peaceful purposes, 
should be available to all, and should be weapon-free.  Hence the relevant options appear to 
reduce to two:  an active contest over national superiority in space, or an elaborated legal regime 
that would undoubtedly be designed to prevent decisive predominance in space by any one 
country, the United States in particular.21   
 
A contest over national superiority in space could extinguish the explicit equal right to 
use space that all nations enjoy, creating instead a de facto regime of control over access and use 
by the first nation to successfully deploy weapons based in space or weapons on the ground that 
target satellites.  Given the immense value of outer space and its resources, other nations might 
develop their own antisatellite weapons designed to break this monopoly.  Countries that lacked 
the capabilities to build such weapons might purchase them.  Space-based weapons would also 
generate instability due to the incentives for preemptive attack that powerful but vulnerable 
weapons systems seem likely to create.  
 
A more elaborated legal regime would be aimed at preventing destabilizing conflicts over 
the use of space.  The problem posed is how to balance the interests of the United States with 
those of the rest of the world.  The U.S. position, if seriously pursued, would pit the United 
States against everyone else, and the support of even close allies could be in question.  Equally if 
not more important, other significant interests of the United States in space will be jeopardized if 
an extended battle over superiority in space develops.  Given the inherent vulnerability of space 
activities, traditional military support activities (including space-tracking, early warning, 
communications, reconnaissance, weather, and navigation) will be in jeopardy.  The viability of 
commercial and scientific activities in space would be in serious question as well. In a conflict, 
terrestrial components of space activities could become objects of attack, while attacks against 
satellites could litter space with speeding debris that might rip into commercial satellites and 
                                                     
19 The ABM Treaty and Missile Defense Testing:  Does the United States Need to Withdraw?  Union of 
Concerned Scientists Working Paper, at www.ucsusa.org/security/ABM analysis.pdf.  The Bush administration 
announced December 13, 2001 that it would withdraw from the ABM Treaty in six months.  U.S. withdrawal took 
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longer bound by the START II treaty, and that “the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty, with the result 
that this international legal act, which served for three decades as the cornerstone of strategic stability, has ceased to 
be in force.”  “On the Legal Status of the Treaty Between Russia and the USA on Further Reduction and Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms,” Russia Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1221-14-16-2002, June 14, 2002, 
available at “Disarmament Documentation,” www.acronym.org.uk/docs/index.htm 
20 China Conference on Disarmament PAROS [Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space] Working 
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Lewis, “Chinese Positions on a PAROS Treaty,” unpublished paper, University of Maryland, 2002. 
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space vehicles, disrupting commercial and scientific activity and communications on the 
ground.25   
 
Although SPACECOM and its supporters aggressively assert their views, advocates of 
weapons in space may be in the minority, even in the Pentagon.  As many observers recognize, 
the interests of the United States in space are much broader than SPACECOM presents.  U.S. 
testing and deployment of orbital weapons could make using space for other military and 
commercial purposes more difficult.  Many in the military, especially those involved in crucial 
military support activities, are quietly aware of this, as are officials at NASA and the 
international space station, and their supporters in Congress.26  Congressional support for 
antisatellite (ASAT) programs does not appear to be deep or widespread.  Serious questions 
remain as to whether the threats to U.S. assets in space are really as great as SPACECOM 
argues, and whether, even if the threats were real, expensive and difficult space-based weapons 
would really be the most effective way to deal with them.  In many cases, those wishing to hurt 
the United States will likely find it much easier, and more effective, to attack terrestrial targets.27   
 
Overall, the risks brought on by a competition for national dominance in space would 
ultimately be detrimental to the United States.  The United States is by far the nation most reliant 
on space for its military and economic well-being.  It has an estimated 600 satellites, both 
military and commercial, in orbit, a number that is expected to more than double during the next 
ten years. Although in the short term the U.S. technological and financial edge in space will 
grow, ultimately the United States will see that advantage diminish over time.  Current U.S. 
doctrines for space such as Vision for 2020 likely underestimate the speed with which U.S. 
advantage as a space power will erode (although SPACECOM advocates hope to preserve this 
advantage through dominating space). 
 
 The choice between a competition for national superiority and a strengthened legal 
regime that preserves and balances the interests of all in space will have profound consequences.  
If the United States aggressively moves weaponry into space, it will likely provoke other nations 
to pursue countermeasures, with destabilizing consequences for global and national security.  In 
addition, by encouraging nations who do not currently have an interest in placing weapons in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
25 Recent studies suggest that a nuclear detonation in space would be extremely destructive.  It would create 
an electromagnetic pulse [radiation] that would destroy satellites in a matter of weeks.  William J. Durch, Twenty-
First Century Threat Reduction:  Nuclear Study Results From DTRA/ASCO (Ft. Belvoir, VA:  Advanced Concepts 
and Technologies Division, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, November 
30, 2001), at www.dtra.mil/about/organization/nuclearstudies.doc. 
26For some skeptical views from the military, see Lt. Col. Bruce M. Deblois, “Space Sanctuary:  A Viable 
National Strategy,” Air Power Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Winter 1998); David W. Ziegler, “Safe Heavens:  Military 
Strategy and Space Sanctuary Thought,” M.A. thesis, The School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Airforce 
Base, AL, June 1997; and Major Howard D. Belote, “The Weaponization of Space:  It Doesn’t Happen in a 
Vacuum,” Aerospace Power Journal (Spring 2000).   
27 For further discussion on this point, see Karl. P. Mueller, “Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?”  
Paper presented at annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, March 27, 2002; and 




space to compete directly and immediately with U.S. space-based assets, the United States will 
almost certainly guarantee the loss of the advantages it seeks to protect.  Although an arms race 
in ASAT weapons is one of the dangers, currently of greatest concern to states such as China and 
Russia is the U.S. use of space systems to augment its nuclear and conventional strategic strike 
capabilities.  From their perspective, the U.S. decision to expand strategic capabilities into space 
represents the collapse of the Cold War bargain of strategic stability based on mutual 
vulnerability.  A military competition in space could thus invigorate a high-tech arms race and 
could renew emphasis on doctrines of nuclear warfare.29  
 
  Finally, a military competition in space would largely extinguish the role of law in space 
in favor of a regime of power.  Despite the narrow organizational appeal of the latter to 
SPACECOM, the much broader interests of the United States in space lie in the promotion of the 
rule of law.  The United States has long been a strong advocate of the rule of law both at home 
and in global affairs, in the latter case seeing it as the best way to promote its interests in an 
interdependent world.  When presented with the choice, it is likely that most users of space---
including the satellite communications industry, those involved in military support operations, 
and the scientific community, including NASA---would prefer the more stable protection 
provided by the rule of law rather than the more uncertain and potentially disruptive protection 
of untested and complex weapons systems.  In sum, the United States and the international 
community have a strong interest in preventing a destabilizing military competition in space 
through the timely negotiation of a more elaborated legal regime for space.     
 
The Current Legal Regime 
 
The current legal regime in space is increasingly fragmented and inadequate to meet the 
challenges of the intensifying use of space.  It consists of several key but very general principles 
expressed in five space treaties adopted since 1967 and an arms control treaty, along with general 
international law and the practices of the spacefaring nations.30  The legal regime also includes 
various agreements covering the commercial uses of space, such as rights to use the 
geostationary orbit and agreements establishing intergovernmental organizations (for example, 
the Intergovernmental Agreement on the International Space Station, the International 
Telecommunications Union, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the World 
Meteorological Organization). The general principles include that space should be reserved for 
“peaceful purposes” and that it is nonappropriable.  However, due to the small handful of states 
historically able to operate in space, these principles have not really been tested and remain 
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treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), bans nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.  Until 
June 13, 2002, when it expired, the ABM Treaty (1972) banned space-based missile defense systems between the 
superpowers.  Both SALT I and SALT II, although primarily about arms control on land, also had an outer space 
component.  SALT I (along with the ABM Treaty) prohibited interference with national technical means of 
verification (i.e. satellites).  The SALT II agreement prohibited the development, testing or deployment of weapons 




largely aspirational.  The definition of “peaceful” is contested and unclear, environmental 
protections for outer space are weak, and there is no agreed-upon operational definition of the 
concept of  “province of all mankind” used in the Outer Space Treaty.  This principle is not 
sufficiently widely accepted that it could be called a principle of customary law.31   
 
Additionally, a recurring tension exists between the communitarian principle of “equal 
access” to outer space and an entrepreneurial principle of “first come, first served.”  The 
spacefaring states have historically been concerned with optimizing the use and exploration of 
outer space while non-spacefaring states have been concerned with influencing rulemaking to 
constrain the activities of those states and to protect their own future interests. 
 
With regard to “peaceful uses,” the current legal regime consists of a set of modest 
limitations regarding military activity in the vacuum of near-earth space, and complete 
nonmilitarization of celestial bodies such as the moon.  Space has always been militarized to 
some degree.  Although the international community has declared that outer space should be 
reserved for “peaceful purposes,” the spacepowers have interpreted this to permit “passive,” or 
military support, activities (observation, surveillance, communications, detection of nuclear 
explosions on earth).  The language of the major treaties was carefully worded so as not to 
prohibit the passage of nuclear ballistic missiles through space.  From the beginning, U.S. space 
programs have been primarily military, not civilian or scientific, in nature.34 
 
Thus the current legal regime imposes certain important prohibitions on military activity 
but also leaves significant gaps.  It prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass destruction, 
including nuclear weapons, in space.  However, it does not cover the transit of nuclear weapons 
through space or nuclear weapons launched from earth into space for the purpose of destroying 
incoming missiles (such as some of the early U.S. and Soviet missile defense interceptors in 
North Dakota and around Moscow permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty).  It also says nothing 
about ASAT weapons or the placement of conventional weapons in space.36  U.S. termination of 
the ABM treaty in June 2002 removed the 30-year prohibition on space-based ballistic missile 
defenses for the superpowers.   
 
In short, major gaps exist in the legal regime to prevent the weaponization of space.  
Under existing international law, both conventional and “exotic” weapons are arguably 
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Yale Journal of International Law 25, (2000), p. 10. 
34 Ivan A. Vlasic, “The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” in Bhupendra 
Jasani, ed., Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Geneva:  UNIDIR, 1991). 
36 Rebecca Johnson, “Multilateral Approaches to Preventing the Weaponization of Space,” Disarmament 
Diplomacy, No. 56 (April 2001).  For an extended discussion of the ambiguities in the existing law, see Peter 
Jankowitsch, ”Legal Aspects of Military Space Activities,” in Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, ed., Space Law:  
Development and Scope (Westport:  Praeger, 1992).  The United States, the Soviet Union and its successor states 
have been unable to agree on an arms control agreement for antisatellite systems, despite several attempts since 




permissible in space.  Two types of space-based weapons are possible:  1) kinetic energy 
weapons (“hit to kill”), which “kill” by hitting another weapon at high speed (although to 
increase their effectiveness they may also carry chemical explosives), and 2) directed energy 
weapons (DEW), which destroy by beaming electromagnetic radiation at the speed of light.37   
 
Civilian satellites largely lack any legal protection under international law.38  They can be 
attacked directly without causing any loss of life and without violating any existing formal legal 
rules.  In contrast to the law for military reconnaissance aircraft, damage to civil remote sensing 
satellites would not necessarily be regarded as an attack on a state’s national security assets, yet 
military services rely increasingly on civilian satellites for communications and observation.39  In 
the absence of agreed-upon controls, such satellites may become objects of attack.  Additionally, 
the laws governing management of, and responsibility for, space debris, remain underdeveloped.  
More than 10,000 objects larger than 10 centimeters (large enough to be continuously tracked) 
whiz in orbit around the earth, along with an estimated 300,000 even smaller pieces of debris.  
Given the tremendous velocity of objects in orbit, even a piece of debris the size of a fleck of 
paint can cause serious damage to spacecraft. 
 
Origins of the Space Regime 
 
The current legal regime was shaped by an initial, nearly universal enthusiasm in the 
1950s for adopting principles for preserving space for peaceful purposes, initially interpreted 
restrictively to mean “nonmilitary” activity.  The United States initially took this position.  This 
was followed soon by actual state practice (of the two superpowers), which quickly established 
that “peaceful” included passive military means.  “Peaceful” would thus be interpreted to mean 
“nonaggressive.” Although much of the developing world objects to this interpretation, and 
prefers to read “peaceful” as meaning “nonmilitary,” no state has ever formally protested the 
passive military uses interpretation, as would be required to prevent a rule of customary 
international law from taking hold.40   
 
The use of space for passive military activities was encouraged by superpower 
perceptions of a close relation between military activity in near-earth space and military activity 
on earth.  The military use of space was driven initially by U.S. interest in the 1950s in satellite 
                                                     
37 One proposed system, an X-ray laser powered by a nuclear explosion, raises the question of what 
precisely constitutes a nuclear weapon.  Some proponents of space-based missile defense systems argue that a 
nuclear-powered laser is not a nuclear weapon.  Another question is whether any of the laser or directed-energy 
weapons, for instance, could be considered “weapons of mass destruction.”   
38 Bhupendra Jasani, “Orbiting Spies:  Opportunities and Challenges,” Space Policy (2001), p. 5.  The 
ABM, SALT and START agreements prohibit deliberate interference with “national technical means,” satellites 
used to verify treaties, but these treaties apply (or applied when they were in force) only to the United States and 
Russia. 
39 I discuss this in greater detail later in the paper. 




reconnaissance capabilities.  The Soviet Union, behind in satellite technology (although ahead 
in launch technology), initially opposed use of space for satellite reconnaissance on the grounds 
that satellites orbiting overhead would violate sovereignty by intruding upon a country’s airspace 
and therefore that they were not “peaceful.”  Once it recognized the benefits of this capability 
and developed its own satellites, however, it eventually accepted the U.S. interpretation that 
“peaceful” should mean “nonaggressive.”  The initial round of negotiations on military activity 
in space, from 1957 through late 1966, thus resulted in a set of rules (including nonmilitarization 
of celestial bodies and modest arms control measures on near-earth space) that conformed 
closely to the superpowers’ existing preferences.41  The use of satellite surveillance for 
monitoring U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements was a significant breakthrough in arms control 
and proved to be an important benefit of this capability.  
 
Three Analogies for Outer Space 
 
Much of the initial effort at regime creation in outer space was framed by three 
analogies—air, high seas, and Antarctica.  As M.J. Peterson has shown, each of these analogies 
suggested a distinct approach to the regulation of space.  The air and high seas analogies implied 
treating outer space as open to forms of military activity accepted under general international 
law, while the Antarctic analogy suggested treating outer space as “off limits” to all military 
activity.42  Because these analogies continue to influence arguments about the regulation of 
space, it is important to understand their contribution the development of the current regime.  
 
 The air analogy supported notions of state control over all activity above its territory.  It 
implied that the same rules regarding military activity that prevailed within a state’s own 
domain, including its airspace, should be applied to outer space.  These rules included the right 
to construct and maintain weapons and armed forces, and to use armed force against 
unauthorized intruders in self-defense.  For example, military aircraft intruding upon national 
airspace can be shot down (civilian aircraft can be escorted or forced down).46  The Soviet Union 
initially supported this analogy in the 1950s, but eventually shifted to the “high seas” analogy 
after developing reconnaissance satellite capabilities in the 1960s.47 
 
 The high seas analogy supported treating outer space as a “commons,” an area open to 
use by all states for the full range of military purposes accepted under international law.  States 
                                                     
41 M.J. Peterson, International Regimes for the Final Frontier, unpublished manuscript, University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst, 2001.  I thank her for sharing this manuscript. 
42 M.J. Peterson, “The Use of Analogies in Developing Outer Space Law,” International Organization 51:2 
(Spring 1997).  Peterson traces how analogies of air, high seas and Antarctica were used by negotiators in the 1950s 
to frame the issue of space.  This discussion draws on her very useful analysis in this article and in her larger 
manuscript. 
46 Peterson, Regimes for the Final Frontier, pp. 146-47.  
47 Note that the concept is at best impractical because, except for Brazil and a few other countries on the 




are free to send warships out on the high seas, limited by the general UN Charter rules 
governing the use of force between states.  States can also send out military patrols, and carry out 
maneuvers and weapons testing so long as these do not interfere with other states’ freedom on 
the high seas.  They do not have the right, however, to shoot down foreign reconnaissance 
aircraft flying above the high seas, even when these aircraft are flying high enough to permit 
observing or photographing portions of the state’s territory.49   
 
 The Antarctic analogy, available after completion of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, 
suggested nonmilitarization of an entire area.  The treaty stated that Antarctica shall be used “for 
peaceful purposes only,” and defined this to mean a prohibition on all military activities.  This 
entailed far more comprehensive limitations than prevailed within the state domain or on the 
high seas.  It banned even forms of military activity regarded as defensive under the UN 
Charter.52 
 
At the time space law was first being developed—in the 1950s—the United States, along 
with many other countries, and most international lawyers, supported the high seas analogy.54  
The decision to apply the notion of “commons” to outer space—i.e. space was 
nonappropriable—effectively ruled out the state domain option (the air space analogy), which 
the Soviet Union at first supported.  The choice between UN Charter rules (permitting the right 
of self-defense, and thus some military activity) or nonmilitarization remained, however, and this 
decision came only with the selection of the “high seas” analogy.55   The high seas analogy has 
remained firmly in place up to now.  
 
What explains the agreement not to militarize the Antarctic?  Several factors appear to be 
relevant.  First, the perceived advantages of a military facility in the frozen Antarctic were low, 
and the perceived difficulty of defending it from attack because of isolation, distance, and 
difficulty of the physical environment were high. This encouraged agreement on mutual 
nonpossession.58   
 
Second, according to Deborah Shapely, the only real reason the United States felt it had 
to establish a military presence there was to make sure the Soviets did not.60  Once it was evident 
                                                                                                                                                                           
49 Peterson, Regimes for the Final Frontier, pp. 147-8.  
52 Ibid., p. 148. 
54Hamilton DeSaussure, “The Freedoms of Outer Space and Their Maritime Antecedents,” in Nandasiri 
Jasentuliyana, ed., Space Law:  Development and Scope. (Westport:  Praeger, 1992). 
55 Peterson, Regimes for the Final Frontier, p. 148.  In 1976, eight equatorial states claimed sovereignty 
over portions of the geostationary orbit, 22,000 miles above the earth.  They argued that the norm of 
nonappropriability perpetuated the space powers’ unfair advantage in space.  This claim has been rejected by all the 
major spacefaring powers.   




that the Soviets would support nonmilitarization, an agreement was quickly reached.  Thus 
mutual U.S.-Soviet interests—the U.S.-Soviet rivalry and a concern to keep the others out--were 
critical.61 
 
Third, a key role was played by the scientific constituency, which lobbied for freedom of 
scientific exploration during International Geophysical Year (IGY) from July 1957-December 
1958.  It secured a temporary “gentleman’s agreement” on free access to the Antarctic, which 
was eventually made permanent in a treaty.  Shapely identifies several political innovations that 
facilitated cooperation and eventual achievement of the treaty:  the temporary demilitarization of 
the Antarctic for the IGY, the pooling of weather and rescue services, previously done on a 
national basis, and a series of personnel exchanges among rival national stations.  Only after the 
IGY showed that such arrangements could work in practice were its temporary arrangements 
made permanent.  It was also important that the scientist constituency favoring demilitarization 
had no rivals.  Had another group of scientists with different interests appeared, the evolution of 
the regime might have been different.62  
 
Fourth, and finally, the symbolic aspects of achieving the treaty may have been a 
motivating factor, especially for the Soviets.  The United States proposed the terms of the treaty, 
including a moratorium on claims to the Antarctic. The Soviets agreed very quickly to the 
proposed ban on military activities, suggesting that they had not been seeking military advantage 
but rather prestige.  From the Soviet viewpoint, a treaty offered a chance to stay on in the region 
and appear equal to the West.  The brevity of the document likely suggests an interest in getting 
an agreement fast.   
 
Thus the treaty legitimized and perpetuated the de facto regime that had evolved rapidly 
in 1957-61, making rules hand-tailored to immediate, practical needs, and sidestepping awkward 
problems like sovereignty and U.S.–Soviet rivalry.  The evolution of military technology since 
then has made Antarctica less rather than more useful militarily.64 
 
Many of the characteristics of the Antarctic---its remoteness, the difficulty of the physical 
environment, and the perceived lack of advantage of military facilities---also applied to celestial 
bodies, though not to the intervening vacuum of space.  Governments and international lawyers 
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soon came to perceive the weaknesses of the high seas analogy as applied to the Moon, and 
found the Antarctic analogy (complete demilitarization) relevant for the Moon.   
 
The North-South Context 
 
Although East-West dynamics influenced many of the early agreements on space, by the 
mid-1970s, as the economic benefits of space became more evident, North-South dynamics 
became much more prominent.  In 1979, the international community concluded negotiations on 
the Moon Treaty.  The initial impulse for negotiations stemmed from superpower desire to avoid 
political-military conflicts regarding the Moon.  However, efforts by the Group of 77 nonaligned 
nations to extend the “common heritage of mankind” principle (borrowed from the deep seabed 
regime) to the Moon soon dominated discussions.65 This principle involved notions of managing 
use of the resources of the Moon and other natural bodies in space by a global intergovernmental 
organization for the benefit of all.  Though a multilateral treaty was written, only ten states have 
ratified it, suggesting little support for this principle as the core of a strengthened management 
regime.  Although the common heritage principle introduces notions of equity into space law, in 
practice the proposed regime for harvesting the Moon’s resources is “even more hypothetical 
than that for the deep seabed, making the discourse all the more ideological due to its abstraction 
from present reality.”66  Nonetheless, the common heritage principle retains significant political 
support and is important symbolically, making it politically necessary to pay attention to it in any 
elaborated regime for space. 
 
Beginning in 1978, efforts were made to amend the Outer Space Treaty by adopting 
additional limitations on military applications of space technology or extending the prohibition 
on military activity from the Moon and other celestial bodies to near-earth space.  In March 
1977, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to discuss prohibiting or severely limiting 
the use and deployment of ASAT weapons in space.  They held three negotiating sessions, from 
June 1978 to June 1979.  Agreement to impose a moratorium on ASAT systems seemed 
imminent at the last of these three meetings. Unresolved problems included the definition of 
ASAT-related activities, and the Soviet demand to include the U.S. space shuttle program under 
the proposed moratorium because of its supposed residual ASAT capability.  Compromise 
proved impossible. Although a fourth round of talks was expected, after June 1979 the Carter 
administration put further talks on hold in order to give priority to ratification of the SALT II 
treaty.  Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the ASAT negotiations, 
like the SALT treaty, fell victim to the new chill in U.S.-Soviet relations.  In 1980 the Soviets 
resumed their ASAT tests.71  In the early 1980s the Soviets proposed several initiatives on ASAT 
arms control, but the Reagan administration, now pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative, 
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showed little interest.  The ASAT talks between the United States and Russia are still formally 
in suspension.  The ASAT issue was subsequently taken up for multilateral consideration at the 
Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) in the context of measures to prevent an arms 
race in outer space.   
 
In recent years, delegates to the CD have proposed a variety of initiatives:  additional 
protocols to existing agreements; universal adherence to existing agreements; new treaties to ban 
the development and deployment of specific weapons in space; a comprehensive international 
regime outlawing any military use of outer space; a strengthening of technical verification to 
ensure compliance with agreements; and a growing emphasis on confidence-building as an 
important means for ensuring the peaceful uses of outer space.72  Although some measures have 
been undertaken, most significant initiatives have been blocked, generally by the United States.  
In opposing strengthened arms control measures in space, the United States insists that there is 
no danger of an arms race in space, and that existing treaties banning the stationing of weapons 
of mass destruction in space are sufficient.  Given the widespread use of space for surveillance 
and communication, the banning of all military activity in space is, in any case, a wholly 
impractical option. 
   
For the last four years, the 66-member CD has been unable to conduct any negotiations at 
all because of a deadlock between the United States and the rest of the members over whether 
the CD should negotiate an agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space.  In June 2001, 
China submitted a draft treaty to prevent the testing, deployment or use of any weapons in outer 
space, leaving no doubt that it was targeted at U.S. plans for missile defense and enhanced space 
capabilities. The United States staunchly opposed it.73  In June 2002, Russia and China submitted 
their first-ever joint proposal to the CD for an international treaty to ban space weapons.  Recent 
statements by U.S. officials suggest that the U.S. position on the issue has hardened, if 
anything.74  
 
Thus the international community appears to have reached an impasse over the future of 
space.  Time and technology do not stand still, however.  If conscious choice fails to determine 
the future of space, it will be determined by default.  Still, as the 40-year history of U.S. restraint 
with regard to space weapons shows, the weaponization of space is not a matter of technological 
determinism.  More accurately, it is a development being pushed by SPACECOM and its 
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supporters with hardly any opposition from, or even scrutiny by, U.S. political leaders.  It is 
now useful to consider what some future options for space might be. 
 
Three Scenarios for the Future 
 
 There are three alternative scenarios for the future of space:  U.S. national dominance, 
“muddling through,” or a more elaborated normative regime including treaties and specific 
operational rules. 
 
U.S. space dominance – In this scenario, the United States, through power politics, 
imposes and enforces rules for outer space as it sees fit.  This could include the possibility of 
stationing weapons in space.  This scenario extends the model of the 1950s and 1960s, when the 
two superpowers, the only spacefaring nations at the time, effectively wrote the rules of space 
through their actions.  In this scenario---to use a favored analogy of its supporters---the United 
States, through its immense technological capabilities, dominates space the way Britain 
dominated the high seas a hundred years ago. Taking advantage of the vastly asymmetrical 
distribution of power in space, the United States enforces and defends a hegemonic order in 
space that promotes U.S. interests and defends U.S. freedom of action. Its essence is a monopoly 
of space and denial of others’ access to it.  It is aimed at using outer space for achieving strategic 
objectives on the ground, and it favors aggressive interpretation of the traditional legal principle 
that “anything that is not expressly prohibited is permitted.”  International treaties and 
negotiations are not seen as particularly relevant, needed, or even desirable for securing an order 
in outer space, while the most extreme views boldly advocate sweeping away even the existing 
law as an unwelcome constraint on the projection of power and the assertion of sovereignty in 
space.76  This is largely the view of SPACECOM and its supporters.  
 
Muddling through – in this scenario, the international community continues its current 
practice of operating under diverse interpretations of nominally shared but vaguely specified 
principles, seeking incremental modifications to the existing regime where it can.  The legal 
regime is shaped largely by unilateral interpretation of general principles combined with 
informal “rules of the road.”  Rule-creation in this scenario is ad hoc, incremental and piecemeal. 
It continues to reflect traditional dominant norms of freedom of exploitation of space. 
Negotiations continue to be dominated by states, and to take place (or fail to take place, as it 
were) in the traditional forums. The United States does not aggressively pursue dominance of 
outer space, but neither does it support an effort at comprehensive rulemaking.  This scenario is 
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nominally the current official position of the United States, which maintains that the existing 
legal regime for space is entirely adequate and that U.S. military plans for space pose no threat to 
other nations. 
 
A more elaborated normative regime – in this approach, the international community 
attempts to negotiate rules that would ensure that commercial, security, and scientific interests in 
space are secured.  It emphasizes international cooperation among all parties with an interest in 
space, and widespread participation in decisionmaking and rulemaking regarding space, 
including by nonstate actors.  Its rules, which would eventually need to be embodied in treaties, 
would be designed to prevent the predominance of any single power in space.  This approach 
would require a shift away from an operational regime based largely on a “freedom of the seas” 
analogy to one based more on principles of comprehensive security, equal protection in space, 
and equity in the use of space resources.  Such an approach may well be favored by a majority of 




For several reasons, the first two scenarios are unlikely to lead to stable outcomes.  As 
discussed earlier, U.S. efforts at space dominance will likely inspire other countries to pursue 
countermeasures to offset U.S. capabilities, thus risking a never-ending search for security in 
space that will leave all worse off.  Some advocates of space weaponization argue that others 
will be “deterred” from responding to U.S. deployment of space weapons for fear of a U.S. 
counterattack or out of a conviction that there is no point competing because the United States 
will always be ahead.81 But proponents of this view have so far offered little explanation of how 
or why this would be the case.  Given the vast U.S. dependence on satellites, other countries 
merely have to pursue an “asymmetrical warfare” strategy of building antisatellite weapons, and 
there are multiple and relatively easy ways to do this.  Because of this, dominance will be very 
hard to achieve, and will also have adverse consequences—including alienating allies, pushing 
Russia and China closer together, and placing at risk other U.S. interests in space.82 
 
Legal possibilities for interference with U.S. space ambitions are also quite extensive.  
Countries party to the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty could take legal action 
on the basis of treaty provisions prohibiting interference with national technical means of 
verification.  The 1972 Liability Convention, and Article 7 of the Outer Space Treaty, on 
liability, make parties that launch objects into space liable for damage to the property of another 
treaty party.  Article 9 of the Outer Space Treaty provides for consultations if any member state 
believes an activity planned by another treaty party would cause “potentially harmful 
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interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.”  Legal actions 
directed at the United States on the basis of these provisions could have a substantial nuisance 
value for the United States, especially if developing countries mobilized behind such actions. 85 
 
The muddling-through scenario is also unlikely to lead to a stable outcome.  It is, in any 
case, more a default possibility than a policy option that can be coherently defended.  It is 
unlikely to adequately balance the variety of interests in space, leading to a less coherent and 
durable regime than would result from a more comprehensive effort at rulemaking.  Most 
importantly, it involves a substantial risk that the current legal regime will collapse if not 
assertively defended.  An analogy of sorts is provided by the incremental militarization of air 
after World War I.  As Jack Hitt notes, the Air Force began as a wing of the Army, flying over 
enemy territory and providing surveillance.  Then the pilots began shooting one another down; 
later they started to drop bombs.  Space can be seen as undergoing a similar process, 
“progressing out of its current stage as an arena of surveillance to microsatellites attacking other 
satellites to, finally, space-based lasers aiming down at fighter jets to blast them from the sky.”86    
 
This is a troubling scenario to many, but it is a likely one if the current legal regime is 
allowed to stagger along without significant reinforcement.  Supporters of weapons in space use 
this analogy to argue that Americans (and others) will eventually grow comfortable with the use 
of space for increasingly aggressive purposes.87  This could possibly be true, but, for reasons 
discussed further below, it is probably less likely than its supporters hope.88  Even if it were true, 
that does not make it inherently desirable.  Achieving a “comfort level” with space weapons---if 
such is possible---will likely come at a very high price. 
 
Thus the muddling-through scenario is more likely a recipe for the slow death of the 
space regime than a viable policy choice for the long haul. A more elaborated normative regime 
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offers the best prospects for securing a stable order in space that preserves security and 
stability for all.  However, the interests in space are diverse and complex, and some of the 
parties, such as those tied to defense industries, may have little interest in keeping space free of 
weapons.  The next several sections lay out some of the considerations that will need to be taken 
into account in thinking about the content of, and strategies for developing, a more robust 
regime. 
 
Space as an Issue Area  
 
Any future regime in space must take into account certain features of space as an issue 
area.  First, creation of regimes for space activity has been conditioned from the start by the 
highly unequal distribution of overall and issue-specific power in the international system.  Long 
dominated by the Soviet-American duopoly, today more than 30 countries possess significant 
space industries and eight provide launch services.  The Russians and Americans remain the 
“major spacepowers” capable of a full range of space activity.  An additional six states or 
regional entities are capable of launching satellites and other objects, but not manned space 
vehicles, into space (Europe, France, China, India, Japan, Israel).89  Finally, a larger group of 
nations, along with four intergovernmental organizations, possess significant space capabilities 
in narrow areas, but are dependent, in one or more critical areas, on other nations to achieve the 
benefits of space.  Many in this group build and operate objects launched for them by one of the 
launching states.90  Though a small minority in a world of over 190 states, the spacefaring states’ 
ability to shape the situation through their own actions has given them extra weight in the 
bargaining process. 
 
Beyond the spacefaring states, a larger group of states selectively participates in space 
systems (e.g. INTELSAT) but possess little in the way of space technology themselves.  This 
group is most concerned with the economic and military significance of space.  Among states 
involved in space activities, they are the group least likely to be a threat to world stability based 
on space capabilities.   
 
A third group of states includes the ever-diminishing number of states that are not 
involved with space in any way.91 Finally, also involved in space are a large number of private 
firms based in industrial states. 
 
The major change in the exploitation of space over the decades is the large increase in 
commercial interest in space.  International space activity has moved increasingly toward 
practical applications for commercial markets, though scientific research stills plays a major role.  
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Commercial space launches started to outnumber military ones in 1998.92  
Telecommunications, remote sensing and Geographic Information Systems (GIS), and Global 
Satellite Navigation Systems (GSNS) are rapidly becoming significant commercial applications.  
They have uses in environmental studies (global observing, climate change, land use, disaster 
management planning) and communications services (broadcasting, communication and 
navigation).  According to some studies, there will be between 262 to 313 communications 
satellites in geostationary orbit by 2006.93  There are also numerous commercial spin-offs such 
as secondary applications of space technology.  The manufacture of launch vehicles has been 
developed into a lucrative industry to meet the needs of the satellite operators.  It is estimated 
that the commercialization of space has already generated $90 billion worth of revenues, a figure 
that, before the collapse of a large part of the telecommunications industry in 2000, was growing 
at an annual rate of 20%.  Pre-2000 estimates of the satellite launch market suggested it would 
generate more than $45 billion over the period 1998-2007.94  These figures are now undoubtedly 
revised downward.  
 
Thus an increasing number of states operate remote sensing on a commercial basis.  For 
example, France, Canada, India, Israel and Russia, in addition to the United States, all have built 
their own satellites and the data from them are sold commercially.98  Economic power in space 
remains concentrated in North America, however.  North America’s share of the top 50 
companies in terms of space revenues has been relatively stable at around 75%, Europe at around 
20% and Asia at around 6%.99 
 
 Access to communications and other benefits of space is of special interest to developing 
nations, which want to bridge the “information gap” between the industrial nations and emerging 
economies.  The Third UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(UNISPACE III), held in July 1999, focused on developing a comprehensive worldwide 
environmental protection program for using space applications for human security and economic 
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development. It brought together member states, leading figures from the world of space 
technology, and, uniquely for a UN conference, private enterprise representatives (global satellite 
navigation systems, for example, did not exist at the time of the previous conference in 1982). 
The UN Office of Outer Space Affairs has organized two symposia for industry on satellite 
services applications since then.100 
 
Of the 1000 active satellites currently in orbit, about an eighth belong to the U.S. 
military, and that percentage will diminish by the end of the decade, when experts estimate that 
operating satellites in space will reach 2000.101  Well over 250 of 2816 total (active and inactive) 
satellites in orbit in February 2003 were operated by international organizations, NGOs, or 
private corporations.102  During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, about 25% of U.S. military 
communications was provided over commercial satellite systems, a number that grew to 85% in 
the 2003 war against Iraq.103  As one military writer noted, “One day we may find ourselves 
defending against armed attacks supported by commercial satellite companies, possibly even the 
same companies supporting our forces.”104 
 
Actors in Space and Their Interests 
 
The various actors in space have different, and sometimes competing, interests, and these 
will influence the type of operational norms and rules that states are likely to agree on in any 
negotiations for a more comprehensive regime. 
 
States.  The Indian and Chinese space programs, like those of Russia and America four 
decades ago, are by-products of missile development that are meant to show off their 
technological prowess.  Both India and China have ambitions as serious space powers.  India 
launched its first test rocket in 1963, and took its first step as a commercial satellite launcher in 
1999, putting South Korean and German satellites into orbit.  With the launch in April 2001 of 
its Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle, designed to put broadcasting and communications 
satellites into geostationary orbit, it has joined the few countries that can launch lucrative, 
heavyweight satellites deep into space.  Developing its own rocket technology has boosted its 
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technological reputation, and some in India have ambitions of sending an unmanned mission 
to the moon.105 
 
 China also has lofty ambitions, and the potential for military space capabilities. The 
Chinese space program began in 1970 with the launch of a satellite on a Chinese-built rocket.  
With its Long March rockets, China is capable of launching anything from small experimental 
satellites to large telecommunications satellites.  It is pursuing its first manned mission in space, 
which it has said it will carry out before the decade is out, with the long-term goal of establishing 
a manned space station.109  Although some observers suggest this project has a military aspect, it 
is likely that China is pursuing the manned space program mostly for the prestige benefits (just 
as Russia and the United States did earlier), because manned programs do not offer significant 
military advantages over unmanned ones.  China has had a photo imaging capability from space 
for about 20 years.  It does not have a publicly identified dedicated antisatellite effort, although it 
is widely suspected of pursuing research on such capabilities.  Existing launch capabilities could 
provide the basis for developing such a system.110  China has been highly concerned to constrain 
U.S. missile defenses and the weaponization of space as a threat to its own small deterrent force. 
 
Europe’s space program is driven by commercial rather than military ambitions.  The 
European Space Agency mostly concentrates on communications technology, earth observation 
and space science.  No evidence exists for any real enthusiasm among European nations to 
develop active space-based weapons systems.   
 
Finally, Japan’s program is somewhere in between.  Japan’s rocket program has been 
commercially uncompetitive in recent years.  After a string of failed launches, Japan began a 
complete reorganization of its space program in 2000.  It has been more successful on the 
scientific front, in 1998 sending a probe to Mars that will search for water.  If Japan’s 
unsuccessful H-2 rocket can be made to work, it could potentially have military uses.116 
However, Japan’s constitutional prohibition against offensive military capabilities, which 
restrains its defense spending, suggests it has little inclination to weaponize space. 
 
Added to this are the large majority of the world’s nations who are primarily interested in 
the economic benefits of space.  Most nations would like guarantees that space will not be used 
against them, and have supported strengthening the legal regime in space to constrain 
weaponization.  This includes key spacefaring nations.  China’s views have been noted, but 
Russia has also called strongly for an international treaty prohibiting weapons in space.  In 
September 2001, Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov outlined several key provisions for any 
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new treaty on space security:  no placing of weapons in orbit, no use or threat of use of 
weapons against targets in space, and establishment of adequate verification mechanisms.118  The 
Russian delegate to the CD reiterated this position in January 2002, calling for a moratorium on 
placing weapons in space until a treaty could be achieved.119   
 
In late June 2002, Russia and China submitted a first-ever joint proposal to the CD for an 
international treaty to ban space weapons, clearly a response to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM 
treaty several weeks earlier.121 Although there was little new in the substance of the proposal, the 
fact that it dropped many self-serving provisions and focused on a few simple points that would 
have broad international appeal suggests that it was a serious effort.  Additionally, the fact that it 
was joint suggests that, as critics of missile defenses have predicted, U.S. pursuit of missile 
defenses is driving Russia and China together, an adverse outcome for the United States.  
Canada, France, Sri Lanka, Egypt, and other members of the CD have also offered proposals to 
begin negotiations on the nonweaponization of space.122  As David Ziegler notes, “any assertion 
that the United States should aggressively pursue weaponization in order to beat adversaries 
already rushing in that direction is highly questionable.”123  
 
  Industry.  In addition to states, a large number of private firms operate in space or 
provide space services to governments.  Just as the interests of industry have been one of the 
major factors conditioning the development of ocean law, so the interests of industry will 
strongly influence policy in space.  For example, the Truman proclamation of 1945, in which the 
United States unilaterally claimed jurisdiction of the continental shelf off its coasts, was driven 
by the needs of the oil industry for legal security over underwater areas beyond the limits of the 
territorial sea as a prerequisite for investment and hence development (this claim eventually 
became generalized as a part of ocean law).  Since only the state could provide such guarantees, 
government was asked to act, and obligingly did so.  Commercial pressure also effectively 
shaped the U.S. attitude toward deep seabed mining.131    
 
Similar dynamics operate in space.  While many telecommunications and satellite firms 
will have an interest in preserving a stable environment in space in which to do business, other 
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companies have a vested interest in the militarization of space.  Large U.S. defense contractors 
such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing, the No. 1 and No. 2 U.S. military contractors respectively 
(Boeing is now the world’s largest space company), have a strong interest in the development of 
the multibillion-dollar U.S. national missile defense.  They are the co-heads of the so-called 
national team being shaped by the Pentagon to integrate more effectively the dozen or so existing 
missile defense programs.  The defense funding bill signed into law January 10, 2002, by 
President Bush includes a lucrative $8 billion for missile defense development.  Other companies 
involved include Raytheon, TRW, Inc., General Dynamics Corp, and Northrop Grumman.133  
These companies can be expected to lobby heavily for the development of U.S. military 
capabilities in space, including weapons. 
 
Even commercial satellite operators may have a close relationship with the military.  
Starting in October 2001, the U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) bought for 
$1.9 million per month the exclusive rights to all images acquired over Afghanistan by the 
IKONOS-2 satellite since the Afghanistan conflict began, to prevent the satellite company from 
selling its pictures elsewhere.  IKONOS-2, the world’s highest resolution commercial satellite, 
was built by a U.S. firm, Space Imaging, and launched in September 1999.134  The company 
called its deal with the U.S. government “a wonderful business transaction.”135  During the 1991 
Gulf War, the U.S. government relied on commercial satellite communications services and 
remote sensing imagery from the French company SPOT Image, while both the Coalition and 
Iraqi forces used channels on ARABSAT.136  Imagery of the Gulf region from both SPOT Image 
and the U.S. Landsat satellite was embargoed during the conflict.137  In 1996, the United States 
relied on INTELSAT for communications among field commanders in Bosnia, and in 1999 for 
Kosovo.138  According to a report prepared for the Rumsfeld Commission, the Pentagon uses 
commercial satellite systems for about 60% of its satellite communications needs.  The Air Force 
currently relies on commercial systems for about 50% of its military satellite communications 
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needs, a number it estimates will rise to about 75%.  The Air Force is also now the largest 
customer for commercial satellite imagery in the world.139  The United States recently decided to 
make commercial satellites the primary source of data for the CIA’s mapping program, in order 
to free up the government’s own satellites for more specialized work.140   
 
 High launch costs, and the fact that the biggest customers for high-resolution imagery are 
governments, will likely sustain the close relationship between commercial satellite operators 
and governments.  However, it is likely that users of satellites (telecommunications and imaging 
companies)---as opposed to the builders (defense contractors)---will see their long-term interests 
better protected by the development of a stable legal regime in space than by its weaponization.  
Commercial users have to date remained largely disengaged from the space weapons issue.  It is 
clear, however, that—contrary to SPACECOM’s fondest visions---commercial satellite operators 
and their backers are not clamoring for military protection, or for hardening standards or other 
measures that might interfere with their profitability.141 
 
 Scientific community.  This includes national space science agencies such as NASA and 
its equivalents, as well as industry and university-based scientists, and the nations cooperating in 
the International Space Station (ISS). This group has a significant interest in preserving space for 
peaceful and scientific purposes, and for promoting international cooperation in its use (although 
the interests of the United States, a major ISS player, may be divided).  Scientists’ groups have in 
the past played important roles in the achievement of arms control and environmental treaties, 
and can be expected to have a strong interest in a more specified rule-based regime for space. 
 
The interests of these groups---states, industry, and the scientific community—will help 
shape the rules for any elaborated space regime.  Views on how best to distribute the economic 
benefits of space are likely to range widely; compared with this, the relative consensus on the 
need to prevent the weaponization of space is quite remarkable.  Only the United States (along 
with defense contractors) currently stands outside it.  The United States justifies its position by 
reference to “freedom of the seas” in space, but this analogy has outlived its usefulness as an 
organizing principle for space. 
 
The Declining Relevance of the High Seas Analogy 
 
 As noted earlier, the high seas analogy has historically played a significant role in 
shaping the current legal regime in outer space. Today, advocates of stationing weapons in space 
regularly invoke “freedom of the seas” as a rationale for space weapons, implying that the 
military use of space will recapitulate earlier experiences with navies on the high seas.  However, 
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a central question is whether this analogy continues to be useful—and whether it is even true.  
Vast changes in both space as an issue area, and in international law itself, point to the declining 
utility of this analogy as a guide to regulating outer space.  Moreover, the historical analogy 
between the high seas and space is flawed; the nature of space, its uses, and its relation to earth, 
are significantly different from the nature and uses of the high seas and their relation to the land. 
 
Within the realm of ocean law, the “freedom of the seas” concept is today seen as an 
increasingly weak principle for guiding management of the oceans.  While long held up as a 
sacrosanct principle, it has always been highly uncertain and contested in practice, and open to 
competing interpretations not only between great and small powers but among European 
seafaring nations themselves.  It is the fact that freedom of the seas has essentially meant “lack of 
law” that has stimulated the drive to articulate ocean law more clearly in the Law of the Sea 
Treaty.  However, although the “freedom of the seas” principle is of declining usefulness to the 
effective regulation of the oceans—for reasons that are also relevant to space---the pattern of 
development of the law of the sea more generally, especially since 1945, is instructive for 
thinking about a more articulated legal regime for outer space.   
 
The High Seas Analogy and Outer Space 
 
Traditionally, the use of outer space, like use of the traditional high seas, has been based 
largely on a “first come, first served” principle. Anything that is not expressly prohibited is 
permitted.  Just as the ocean-going powers, with large deep-water navies, traditionally exercised 
a dominant influence on the development of ocean law, so the dominant space powers have 
disproportionately shaped space law.  Prior to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, ocean law 
developed very much as customary law based on state practice, where power largely shaped the 
rules---just as has largely been the case with space so far.  When President Eisenhower first 
established the nation’s space policy in the mid-1950s, it was built around the explicit notion of 
“freedom of space” and a “space-for-peaceful-purposes” policy.  While this effort was partly for 
propaganda purposes, it was also designed to fend off any claims of sovereignty over space that 
might limit U.S. freedom of action there. 
 
Advocates of weaponizing space draw on the high seas analogy in justifying their 
position. They argue that the Outer Space Treaty’s reference to the UN Charter’s right of self-
defense permits uses of space deemed necessary for national security (just as it permits use of the 
high seas for similar purposes).  In May 2002, Ambassador Eric Javits, the Bush administration’s 
negotiator at the CD in Geneva, stated that “Article 51 of the UN Charter makes it clear that all 
Member States have the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.  The global 
responsibilities of the United States, and the new threats facing it in today's world, require that 
that right be exercised both on the Earth and above it.”148  This right, in the view of space 
weapon supporters, would include not only military support missions but also potentially the 
military force application missions arising from the stationing of weapons in space.   
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More specifically, the logic of national dominance promoted by advocates of space 
weapons relies heavily on the analogy with dreadnaughts sailing on the high seas.  Just as Britain 
ruled the waves a hundred years ago under a freedom of the seas principle, so the United States 
can rule space today.  According to one writer, invoking the sea power theory of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, “Much as the British ruled their vast Empire through control of a few critical outposts, 
occupation of critical space chokepoints—terrestrial launch facilities, low-earth orbit in the near-
Earth space, the Moon and libration points in Lunar space, and the planets, primary asteroids, 
and major moons of Solar space—will guarantee dominance and control of the space lines of 
communication and commerce.”149  This list would appear to involve well more than a “few” 
chokepoints, however.   
 
Its frequent invocation notwithstanding, the freedom of the seas analogy is both 
simplistic and misleading.  First, it relies implicitly on a false dichotomy between law and 
“freedom of action,” implying that these two concepts are mutually exclusive.  However, the 
law/freedom of action dichotomy has been gradually disappearing as a meaningful distinction in 
international practice.150  The rise of interdependence and globalization means that actors 
interfere with each other, both deliberately and inadvertently.  “It is increasingly clear that no 
single country---or a small group of countries—can consistently achieve its objectives through 
unilateral action or ad hoc coalition,” a situation referred to as “the new sovereignty.”151  The 
number of states has expanded greatly, while the number, velocity, types and complexity of 
international and transnational interactions are increasing even more rapidly.  These 
developments require very high levels of coordination and cooperation among complex 
activities.  They make it increasingly difficult, if not often impossible, for a state to achieve its 
interests purely through informal, ad hoc, or unilateral approaches.  As Chayes and Chayes 
argue, “the traditional attributes of effective foreign policy in the security area—flexibility, 
energy, secrecy—tend to give way before the growing importance for the new sovereignty of 
predictability, reliability, and stability of expectations.”152  The development of, and compliance 
with, rules governing an issue area becomes not so much a constraint on the freedom of action of 
the state as a necessary condition for realizing its full range of objectives.  This trend is clearly 
reflected in ocean law where there is no better example than the decision of the anti-treaty Bush 
administration in November 2001 to join the Law of the Sea (LOS) treaty, seven years after it 
came into force.153   
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 A second weakness of the high seas analogy is that the concept of “freedom of the 
seas” is increasingly less useful even for the oceans, for reasons that are also relevant to outer 
space.  The notion of freedom of the seas evolved at a particular historical time to meet the needs 
of a particular era.  It has not been a static concept.  Rather, it has changed as the nature of the 
international community and its needs and interests have changed.  The extent of freedom of the 
seas therefore depends on state practice rather than on any innate quality of the high seas.  
 
The Evolving High Seas Concept  
 
Freedom of the seas is the principle that outside its territorial waters, a state may not 
claim sovereignty over the seas except with respect to its own vessels. The notion of freedom of 
the seas as coined by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius in 1609 in his famous Mare Liberum was 
based in part on a widespread perception at the time that the seas had “limitless” resources.  
Grotius argued that the seas should be free for navigation and fishing because natural law forbids 
ownership of things that “seem to have been created by nature for common use.” Things for 
common use are those that “can be used without loss to anyone else.”154  From Grotius’ 
perspective, the fish of the oceans seemed limitless, and thus fishing efforts by one nation did not 
interfere with the right of other nations’ vessels to fish in the same region.  Grotius also argued 
that the seas cannot constitute property because they cannot be occupied in the sense in which 
land can be occupied and that they are therefore free to all nations and subject to none. In 
developing his argument Grotius drew on Roman legal principle and may have drawn on the free 
navigation traditions of Asia and the East Indies.   
 
Grotius’ effort was actually a political tract to defend the Dutch East India Company’s 
right to navigate in the Indian Ocean and other Eastern seas over which Spain and Portugal had 
asserted a commercial monopoly as well as political domination. Claims that asserted territorial 
sovereignty over the seas had increased markedly during the 16th and 17th centuries, largely 
because of the growth in world trade following the discovery, exploration and colonization of 
new lands. 
 
 Two hundred years were to pass before Grotius’ principle prevailed. In the meantime, 
John Selden’s Mare Clausum (1635), advocating “closed seas”---controlling as much ocean as a 
state’s power would permit---became the operative guide.  Selden’s tract was published at the 
express command of King Charles of England to express England’s view on the subject and to 
defend the “Dominion of the British Seas.”155  Selden, a prominent scholar, historian and lawyer, 
tried to prove that the sea had in fact been appropriated in many cases.  He also asserted that the 
seas did not have inexhaustible resources.156   
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Despite Grotius’ tract on freedom of the seas, the Dutch East India Company paid little 
attention and went on to try to pursue a monopoly of trade, eventually defeating the Portuguese 
in the East Indies and expanding into empire. Grotius himself later abandoned the arguments of 
his book in defense of the imperial interests of his country.  From the late 15th century to the 
early 19th century, the major powers attempted to exclude commercial rivals from parts of the 
open sea.  They attacked other ships and actively tried to prevent commerce by other nations in 
areas where the major powers claimed dominion.  The Dutch championed freedom of the seas in 
the Atlantic (where the British dominated) while claiming mare clausum in the East Indies 
(where they dominated), while the British claimed mare clausum in the Atlantic and pleaded for 
open seas in the East Indies.  In defending England’s claims for sea dominion in the Channel, 
Selden was forced to disprove French claims to a similar dominion.161  Mare clausum largely 
prevailed during this period because of the weight of British naval power behind it.  King 
Charles had started building up the British naval fleet, and in the 18th century the Atlantic 
became virtually an English lake. 162 
 
It was not until after the Napoleonic wars and the rise of European imperialism in the 19th 
century that freedom of the seas became the operative principle.  Great Britain, as the strongest 
naval and industrial power, became its champion and policeman.  Why did Britain shift to 
support of mare liberum after 1815?  Three primary factors explain the shift.  First, 
economically, freedom of the seas was more suited to the needs of the industrial revolution in 
Europe than was mare clausum.  The industrial revolution in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries, along with the rise of 19th century imperialism, vastly expanded commercial 
possibilities.  As Europeans became more interested in commercial prosperity and trade, and 
ever more Europeans needed to travel to Asia and Africa, freedom of the seas became accepted 
as a more useful principle, and mare clausum came to be seen as an anachronism.164  Britain, as 
the cradle of the industrial revolution, stood to benefit greatly from a system based on free trade 
and open seas. 
 
Second, the freedom of the seas principle also prevailed because the British (and the 
Dutch) had the military might to protect the right of their commercial vessels to sail unrestrained 
throughout the oceans.  Third, and finally, on the ideational side, a shift in the dominant 
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economic philosophy in Britain from mercantilism to liberalism provided a key intellectual 
underpinning for free trade and the freedom of the seas principle.168   
 
Efforts to codify the freedoms of the high seas began early in the 20th century.  Most 
influential were the law of the sea drafts prepared by international legal scholars.  These drafts 
provided four distinct freedoms:  freedom of navigation; freedom of fishing; freedom to lay 
submarine cables and pipelines; and freedom to fly over the high seas.  The work of these 
scholars developing the notion that freedom of the seas was really a composite of specific 
freedoms had a great impact on the official conventions that followed.172 
 
Already by the 1950s, however, Grotius’ principle no longer prevailed.  In 1950, the 
famous French jurist Gilbert Gidel had already said that in “fisheries and mineral resources the 
Grotian tradition of freedom of the high seas is losing its paramountcy which, generally 
speaking, has survived fairly well down to the present day.”174  He wrote, “The expression 
‘freedom of the high seas’ is in reality a purely negative worn-out concept, nothing more; it has 
no meaning for us, except as the antithesis of another, positive concept [i.e. the high seas are 
subject to territorial dominion], which has long since disappeared.”175 While the purely negative 
concept might be suitable for the use of the sea as a means of communication, it was not suitable 
for the sea as a source of wealth, because the resources were not inexhaustible.  This is even truer 
today.  In recent decades, developments such as drift net use leading to overfishing and 
widespread marine pollution challenge the view that the seas have “limitless” resources and 
capacity to absorb activities.  Military activities on the sea also pollute and interfere with other 
kinds of activities.  One of the historic freedoms of the high seas has been the “freedom” to use 
the oceans as a garbage dump.  Now we know that the oceans do not have an infinite capacity to 
assimilate pollution.176    
 
Such concerns led the international community to begin its efforts to codify ocean law, 
first in a set of conventions in 1958, and then in a more comprehensive effort that resulted in the 
1982 Law of the Sea Convention.  At the time, overfishing was already a problem, and 
protracted and bitter fisheries disputes prevailed among European states. Offshore oil drilling 
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was in its infancy, but its potential was already apparent.  The 1958 conference produced four 
conventions, but these largely asserted the traditional law of the sea, codified traditional practices 
of the great powers and left large gaps, which continued to widen during the subsequent decades.  
No agreement was reached on the outer limits of the territorial sea, on fisheries jurisdiction, or on 
the limits of the continental shelf.  States could pick and choose among the four conventions, 
becoming parties to any one and ignoring the others.  The treaties thus produced a fragmented 
system that allowed chaotic claims to national jurisdiction, extermination of fisheries, and 
pollution of the marine environment.179  Conservation of the marine environment and the 
fundamental importance of marine science and technology were not understood as yet, and there 
was no notion of the unity of ocean space and the interaction of ocean uses.180  The treaties, in 
short, codified what had already been accepted, and left unsettled what had not, including where 
the high seas began.181  They revealed the weakness of an ad hoc, as opposed to a more 
comprehensive, arrangement. 
 
It was evident something had to be done. Three major factors converged to motivate the 
effort toward developing a more comprehensive regime:  1) the great powers wanted the limits of 
national jurisdiction stabilized to protect the freedom of navigation; 2) new states that had not 
participated in earlier law of the sea conferences wanted their say, and 3) the relentless march of 
technological development made marine resources available further out and deeper down, 
hastening the extinction of commercial fisheries and the pollution of the marine environment.184   
 
Developing countries, especially, have generally been critical of traditional ocean law as 
codified in the 1958 Convention on the High Sea, and of the concept of freedom of the seas, 
which, they believe, has been inimical to their interests, just as they have been critical of the 
“first come, first served” principle of outer space.  After 1960, the trend toward curbing the 
freedom of the seas by extending coastal state jurisdictions for the protection of security and 
economic interests of the coastal states increased.  When the Third UN Law of the Sea 
Conference (UNCLOS III) convened in 1974 in Venezuela, the new majority of the developing 
countries made it clear that it was only the great seafaring countries “that profited from these 
unlimited and undefined freedoms” of the traditional law.  The continuing laissez-faire of the 
high seas had ceased to serve the interests of international justice.185  As the representative of 
Kenya pointed out during the negotiations, “in 1970 the developed countries with less than one-
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third of the world’s population, had taken 60 percent of the world catch of fish, while only 40 
percent had gone to the developing countries.”186   
 
Arvid Pardo’s early draft treaty of the law of the sea convention was based on the 
conviction that laissez-faire on the high seas had become dysfunctional.  The treaty that 
eventually emerged from negotiations in 1982, while preserving the concept of freedom of the 
seas, did so in a much-circumscribed fashion.  It also departed from traditional ocean law in 
many ways.  The treaty reduced the size of the high seas by the extent of the 200 mile “exclusive 
economic zone” but nevertheless reaffirmed that the governing regime for the remaining high 
seas is one of freedom of access and use.187  However, these “freedoms” on the high seas must be 
exercised with “due regard” to the interests of other states and embody a concept of “reasonable 
use.”  One of the main principles of the UNCLOS conference was that in the future the sea must 
be used for the benefit of all and not merely for the interest of a few great powers.  There will be 
freedom but, like the freedom an individual enjoys in society, it is not unlimited but rather is 
enjoyed under agreed-on legal principles.188   
 
The contrast with the traditional law of the sea is important to note, both with regard to 
new principles of law established, and with regard to the process by which the 1982 regime was 
created. It established the notion of “common heritage of mankind” as a guiding principle for 
regulating the use of global “commons.”  In the LOS treaty this applied particularly to the deep 
seabed, but it introduced notions of equity and a global public interest.  The treaty evolved in 
little more than a decade, through a truly international process that attempted to address the 
broadest possible agenda of national wishes and aspirations.  In contrast, the old law of the sea 
evolved gradually, within narrower confines, and was the product of inputs from relatively few 
states (the 1958 conferences involved about 86 states, in 1982 about 150).   
 
 The legal regime for outer space today bears significant similarities to the unsatisfying 
state of ocean law in the late 1950s and early 1960s, after the 1958 conventions but prior to the 
1982 treaty.  In the ocean regime of that time, agreement existed on a vague freedom of the seas, 
implying freedom of peaceful navigation with a few agreed “rules of the road” that benefited 
European seafaring states, but little agreement existed on other rules.  Similarly, space today is 
characterized by broad principles (“peaceful purposes,” nonappropriability, freedom of use) 
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largely left open to unilateral interpretation.  Just as states could pick and choose among the 
1958 ocean conventions, so states today can pick and choose among the current outer space 
treaties.  Finally, the space regime up to this point, like the pre-LOS ocean regime, has largely 
been defined by the small number of nations with capabilities to exploit it. 
 
Freedom of the seas, in other words, meant in practice largely a lack of law.  It was 
insistence on the right of freedom from any kind of interference (most strongly defended by 
Britain), leaving uses of the ocean open to unilateral interpretation without regard for possible 
consequences, and with little accountability.  As nations eventually discovered, in the absence of 
agreed-upon rules, use of the ocean became a chaotic, uncertain, and often conflictual matter. 
 
“Reasonable Use” and the Military Loophole 
 
Even though the 1982 treaty does preserve the freedom of seas concept, albeit in circumscribed 
form, for many ocean law experts today, as well as for many states, the principle appears increasingly 
anachronistic and inadequate for meeting today’s complex challenges to the sea.  Technological 
developments and the practices of states in recent years have demonstrated dramatically the inadequacy of 
this approach.  The notion of “reasonable use,” for instance, remains too open to subjective and unilateral 
interpretation, leaving the door open to “anything goes” attitudes.  Especially problematic, the principle is 
nearly useless for controlling military activities, leaving them essentially unregulated.  Nuclear states 
claim the right to declare broad areas of the high seas as exclusionary or warning zones off limits to free 
navigation, to serve their military purposes, including nuclear and ballistic missile testing and naval 
maneuvers.  These zones, which have laid claims to areas as large as the 400,000 square miles around 
Bikini atoll for U.S. tests, can significantly interfere with other uses of the seas, such as fishing and 
navigation (the radioactive contamination of the Japanese fishing boat “Lucky Dragon” in 1954 is a sad 
example).  Weapons testing and combat training can also cause environmental damage, especially 
harmful in areas designated for scientific research.  In some cases military activities have resulted in 
significant damage to commercial vessels.189   
 
Although the nuclear powers proclaim their adherence to the freedom of the high seas in 
the abstract, conflicts with the principle arise when they assert claims of “national security” to 
justify use of the seas for weapons testing.194  The nuclear testing programs in the Pacific Ocean 
generated widespread protests against atmospheric testing of nuclear bombs and against the 
legality of exclusionary danger zones.  In 1963, in response to public concern about radioactive 
contamination from testing, and a general sense in both the United States and the Soviet Union 
that restraint was called for after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and Britain negotiated the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which moved their nuclear test 
programs underground.  France and China continued to test in the atmosphere.  When, after a 
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long break, France resumed nuclear testing in the Muroroa atoll in 1995, antinuclear 
movements organized a boycott of French wine and other goods, stunning French leaders and the 
military establishments of the nuclear states by the strong public outcry and forcing France to 
curtail the testing program.195  Testing on the high seas is probably now prohibited by customary 
international law (it is hard to argue that a nuclear test on the high seas shows “reasonable 
regard” for the interests of other states).  While missile testing has somewhat less of an impact on 
the environment than nuclear weapons testing, it is likely that missile testing on the high seas 
will continue to be accepted as a legitimate use of the sea only as long as it does not significantly 
interfere with navigation and fishing or pose serious safety concerns.196  
 
 Thus the freedom of the seas concept, even with the addition of the “reasonable use” 
principle, often remains too abstract and open to unilateral interpretation.  Ocean law experts 
challenge the conventional wisdom that freedom of the seas is a sacrosanct principle that 
promotes universally positive values.  Many argue that “freedom of the seas” should finally be 
abandoned for good; it must be recast as “freedom for the seas,” an approach that takes a more 
ecological perspective and emphasizes widespread participation in decisionmaking regarding the 
oceans, and the need for a more refined regime for ocean regulation.198  
 
In sum, the factors discussed here—the general decline of the law/freedom of action 
dichotomy in international practice due to the rise of interdependence, and the declining 
usefulness of the freedom of the seas concept even for the seas___point to the declining relevance 
of the high seas analogy for outer space.  Space is more like the seas of today than the seas of a 
hundred years ago.  As noted earlier, there are more, and a greater variety of, actors involved in 
space.  Space is not “limitless,” and it does not have an infinite capacity to absorb activities.  The 
tiny tube of space available for geostationary satellites and the increasing quantity of debris in 
near-Earth space place serious physical limits on space activities, while military activities in 
space could preempt other uses.  On the policy side, the lack of an agreed-on definition of 
peaceful uses, the lack of a clear definition of outer space or of space weapons, and the lack of 
legal protection for commercial satellites, make for an uncertain and unpredictable global order 
in space. 
 
 Although the United States has long championed freedom of the seas, it has also played a 
significant role in departing from the purely negative concept of freedom of the seas.  As early as 
1887, the United States tried to convince European governments and Japan of the desirability of 
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international cooperation for the “better protection of the fur-seal fisheries in the Bering 
Sea.”199  Its dispute with Great Britain over fur-seal fishing___whether fur-seals could be 
protected outside the 3-mile limit of the territorial sea___initiated the trend for change in the law 
and the protection of coastal fisheries by the coastal states.  The most important challenge to the 
traditional law of the seas doctrine came with the 1945 Truman proclamation extending U.S. 
jurisdictional claims over the continental shelf.  This led to numerous claims by other states for 
continental shelf jurisdiction and protection of fisheries, codified several decades later in the 
LOS Treaty.  Thus the United States itself has often sought to balance “freedom” with 
cooperation to manage resources and activities.  
 
 
Beware Simplistic Analogies:   
The False Analogy Between Freedom of the Seas and the Military Use of Space 
 
The weakness of the freedom of the seas concept in regulating military uses of the oceans 
points to its even greater inadequacy for regulating military uses of space, because the military 
threat posed by space weapons could conceivably become even greater than that posed by 
weapons on or under the high seas.  Supporters of weapons in space suggest that there is little 
conceptual difference between warships on the high seas and weapons in space.  Both operate in 
a global commons under a freedom of access and use principle. Thus the United States should be 
free to transit space with weapons, just as on the high seas.  Further, just as navies are needed to 
escort commercial shipping, so commercial satellites in space will need military protection and 
escorts.  According to one Air Force general, “satellite systems of the United States and its allies 
are, for the most part, unprotected on the open seas of space” and thus they need “some form of 
security or escort.”200  According to General Thomas Moorman, Jr., a member of the Rumsfeld 
Space Commission, as the number of U.S. satellites in space increases, the United States “will 
want to provide the necessary protection and deterrence to attack.  Here the naval analogy with 
freedom of the seas is apt.”201  
 
These are dubious analogies.  Several significant differences exist between freedom of 
the seas and the military use of space.  First, the implicit threat from military activities at sea at 
the time the traditional law of the sea was laid down is nothing like the potential threat from 
space if space were to become weaponized.  The freedom of the seas concept evolved in the era 
of 19th century battleships when the difference between the territorial sea and the high seas was 
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real.  Warships on the high seas were out of range of land and were thus unable to threaten 
coastal states unless they came in close.  Today’s modern nuclear and cruise-missile armed ships 
and submarines are an anomaly in this regard.  They eliminate any protection the territorial seas 
once provided, leaving all states vulnerable to attack from the high seas.  This is clearly an 
unsatisfying situation for many coastal states, and helps account for the numerous unilateral 
claims of sovereignty by coastal states over waterways that border their territory, presumably in 
violation of traditional free navigation norms.204  
 
This vulnerability would be exacerbated in space, where factors of speed, the 
vulnerability of space activities to disruptions with consequent effects on earth, and the perceived 
close link between military activity on earth and military activity in space would enhance the risk 
posed to others.  Here is it useful to distinguish between the physical effects of space weapons 
and their geostrategic impact.  From the perspective of their physical effects, in most cases, 
space-based weapons increase present threats rather than replace them by much greater threats. 
Space-launched missiles move hardly any faster and reach no farther than submarine-launched 
missiles.  Space-borne weapons are much more vulnerable than land-based weapons.  And inland 
nations are not really safer from attack from the oceans than attack from space.   
 
However, space-based directed energy weapons, such as lasers, would move faster, and 
could strike targets on earth and in the atmosphere with enormous speed.212  Lasers would also 
pose a significant threat to the survivability of space systems.  They might make possible a 
prompt “sky-sweeping” attack against military satellites without significant tactical warning.  In 
such a case, redundancy of satellites would be of little value. This would pose a threat of great 
magnitude to a state dependent on satellites for essential military functions.  More generally, 
strategic defense systems based in space will pose significant threats to other space-based 
systems, and to targets in the atmosphere and on earth as well. 
 
In terms of their geostrategic impact, space-based weapons do not simply enhance 
existing threats but introduce a new and greater danger because of the threat they pose to 
strategic stability. The vulnerability of space-based weapons will likely create incentives for 
preemptive attack to protect them during a crisis, greatly increasing the likelihood of war.  
Further, although supporters of space weapons claim that, consistent with the United States’ 
defensive orientation to the world, such weapons would be for defensive purposes, the reality is 
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that, given their characteristics, many of them are inherently offensive weapons.  It is widely 
recognized that space-based ballistic missile defense systems could carry out surprise attacks 
against terrestrial targets or satellites.  
 
Exacerbating the threat posed by space weapons is the Cold War-era deterrence logic that 
continues to dominate U.S. military planning.  This logic emphasizes deterrence of threats 
through overwhelming force, carried out during the Cold War through the confrontational 
posturing of large, opposing forces on hair-trigger alert.  The extension of this deterrence logic to 
space, as envisioned in current U.S. space plans, will turn space into a domain of overwhelming 
threat, against which most states have little protection.216  The new “pre-emptive” logic of the 
Bush administration’s first National Security Strategy, released in September 2002, will make 
this situation even worse.217  The launching into space of an armada of space “battle stations,” 
1500 “Brilliant Pebbles” antimissile satellites, or “several thousand interceptors,” would 
certainly seem to violate the important norm prohibiting the “threat of force” in relations 
between states.218  
  
Finally, the “right of passage” in space, including by private actors, risks being 
transformed into a “right of stay” because of the close link between private actors and 
governments in space activities, and the continued prevalence of a “first come, first served” 
ethic.219  In sum, for several reasons, the transit of space is not nearly as “innocent” as transit 
over the ocean.  
 
A second flaw of the freedom of the seas analogy is that the need for “naval” escort in 
space is not the same as on the seas.  As Karl Mueller and Peter Hays point out in a critique of 
the Air Force’s conservative thinking about space, “commercial space activities are 
fundamentally different from merchant shipping and air transport in every respect, save that all 
three are economically important.”220  One difference is that satellites collect, relay or transmit 
information, while commercial shipping transports goods and people.  As they note, this has a 
number of significant implications.  Unlike for the oceans, space piracy is not a problem, so 
space navies are not required to suppress it.  In addition, the vulnerability of satellite 
communications to attack can be reduced by relaying transmissions through backup and 
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redundant systems (goods and people, in contrast, can only travel on one vessel at once).221  In 
short, satellite commerce resembles telegraphy or radio more than it does maritime trade. 
Mueller and Hays caution space strategists to “resist the temptation to engage in easy but 
fallacious generalizations about the equivalence of maritime trade and commercial space 
operations, or the need to escort commercial satellites as if they were ships at sea.”222  In their 
view, relying on false analogies inhibits the Air Force from thinking seriously about how space, 
and threats to activities in space, are different from those in other domains.   
 
A third flaw of the freedom of the seas analogy is that what advocates of space weapons 
are proposing for U.S. policy is not an accurate parallel with how Britain actually policed the 
seas in the 19th century.  Britain’s naval policing activities during the reign of Pax Britannica 
involved a significant element of restraint, and did not extend to actively denying others’ access 
to the seas or naval capabilities that it found threatening.  Instead, the Royal Navy’s policy 
focused primarily on three things: 1) protecting British traders’ lives and property by suppressing 
piracy, despots, and uprisings in the colonies (for example, port closures and takeovers) that 
threatened to disrupt free trade, 2) suppressing the slave trade, and 3) charting the oceans.225  
Britain also sought to enforce the three mile territorial sea.  In these policies Britain enjoyed both 
domestic and international support, including from the other great powers, which coincided 
sufficiently to condone unilateral British military action.  By undertaking foreign military 
initiatives only in pursuit of long-established, narrowly focused policies for which there was 
widespread support, Britain was able to use its power to promote its policies, and to do so with a 
significant degree of legitimacy. 
 
As important is what the Royal Navy did not do:  although it did employ “gunboat 
diplomacy” on some occasions, and did irritate other nations by trying to restrict free trade by 
neutrals in wartime, in general it did not impose a British peace on the world; it made no effort to 
keep the French from entering Algiers in 1830, or Mexico in 1863, or Indonesia in the 1860s, nor 
to keep the Americans out of Japan in the 1850s, or the North from blockading the South in the 
American civil war.229  In the view of British leaders, while Britain should use the Royal Navy 
                                                     
221To reduce vulnerability, satellite systems should emphasize a large number of small satellites.  Hays and 
Mueller, “Going Boldly___Where?” p. 41; and Mueller, “Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?” pp. 5-7.  As 
they note, the Air Force does not routinely make a practice of escorting commercial airliners even though they are 
economically important and entirely vulnerable to attack. 
222 Ibid., p. 41.  Even with respect to the oceans, the need for great power naval forces to enforce the 
freedoms of the seas is much reduced in the context of a strong international consensus on maritime issues, as has 
been taking shape under the LOS treaty.  In the future, it would be desirable to have more internationalized naval 
forces and more cooperation of national navies.  Some analysts argue that, as part of an effort to develop legitimate 
multilateral naval forces, the law of the sea will need to repudiate unilateral uses of warships for upholding the 
freedom of the seas.  Joshua Handler, “Denuclearizing and Demilitarizing the Seas,” in Van Dyke, Zaelke, and 
Hewison, Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century, pp. 432-33. 
225 Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy. 
229 Gerald S. Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy:  Studies in British Maritime Ascendancy 




effectively, this meant a policy of limits and restraint.  The selective use of gunboat diplomacy 
gave considerable added weight to British policies with relatively little involvement of British 
military forces in actual combat___hence the 100 years of so-called “Pax Britannica.”  According 
to historian Gerard Graham, “it was this general desire to avoid war”—and the restraint which 
that entailed—“that made the so-called age of Pax Britannica possible.”230   
 
The U.S. role in space proposed by SPACECOM and its supporters would be far more 
overwhelming than that of the British navy in centuries past.  The more accurate parallel to Pax 
Britannica for the United States in space would not be preemptive denial of access to space by 
others that might threaten in the future, but rather the development of a security and economic 
regime in space, around a relevant organizing principle, that enjoyed international consensus.  
The essential contribution of British hegemony was to promote and enforce the development of a 
“regime” around a new principle—freedom of the seas—that was relevant to the security and 
economic interests of the times and hence enjoyed widespread support.  The relevant lesson of 
Pax Britannica for space in the 21st century is not the freedom of the seas principle itself; rather 
it is the model Great Britain provides of a hegemon leading the way in promoting transition to 
new economic and security principles.  Crucial to British success in its role as a “benign 
hegemon” was the support and legitimacy its policies enjoyed.  U.S. plans for space dominance 
do not currently enjoy this kind of international support or consensus.  They show little prospect 
of doing so any time soon. 
 
A final argument of space weapons supporters draws on historical analogies of 
weaponization generally to demonstrate that the weaponization of space is “inevitable.”  
According to an Air Force analyst, “the weaponization of space is as inevitable as was the 
weaponization of the land, sea, and air media of warfare.”231  The Rumsfeld Space Commission 
report trades heavily on the inevitability argument.232  Whether desirable or not, these proponents 
argue, the weaponization of space is going to happen.  They believe the first state to place 
weapons in space will have a great advantage over rivals, so if some nation is going to be first, it 
should be the United States.   
 
Arguments from technological determinism or “human nature” are popular (and are 
certainly in the interests of the U.S. Air Force).  However, although land, sea and air have indeed 
become battlefields, there is no inherent reason that space must become one too.  As Karl 
Mueller argues, because militarization proceeded differently on land, sea and air, facile analogies 
between these domains and military space does not predict whether there will be weapons in 
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space.233  Large areas of the planet, he notes, have been set off limits to nuclear weapons (e.g., 
the seabed, the Antarctic, nuclear weapons free zones), as has the Moon, and some weapons have 
been prohibited (biological and chemical weapons, landmines).  Finally, space itself has so far 
remained unweaponized.  As the current debate over the desirability of space weapons shows, 
the 45-year tradition of superpower restraint with regard to weapons in space has become a 
politically significant norm.  As Mueller notes, in the very near term, say a decade or more, 
space weaponization is not inevitable “for the simple reason that only the United States possesses 
the resources and capabilities that would be required to deploy space weapons in a serious way.”  
In the longer term, whether space is weaponized will certainly be affected by the decisions of 
U.S. leaders in the coming decade.234 
   
For several reasons, then, the analogy between freedom of the seas and the military use of 
space is a false one.  Transit of space by orbiting weapons is not nearly as “innocent” as transit 
over the oceans, satellites are not like ships at sea, and the proposed U.S. role in space would be 
far more overwhelming than the role of Britain during the 19th century.  It is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that, in reality, what SPACECOM and its supporters actually want is a version of 
mare clausum, in which the United States controls space to the full extent of U.S. power.  Their 
use of the freedom of the seas analogy is, in the end, disingenuous:  the aspect of the 19th century 
British experience they are actually most enamored of is the notion of empire, not the freedom of 
the seas principle. Mahan’s theory of control of “chokepoints” is a theory of empire, not a theory 
of free trade and commerce.   Doctrines centering on control and domination are theories of 
empire and war, not theories of freedom.  As one Air Force analyst admits, the development of 
space forces to protect assets in space “challenges the notion of ‘freedom of space,’ and ‘space 
for peaceful purposes,’” because, he notes, in wartime nations are quick to abandon freedom of 
the seas. 235 
 
The solution to the future of space is not to continue using an easy but outdated analogy 
from the 19th century___which fails to address effectively the problem of modern weapons on the 
ocean, let alone in space___but rather to develop a new, more appropriate normative regime for 
space. None of the existing analogies provides an adequate basis for devising rules for space.   
Principles of accountability, fairness and equity in international law and practice, especially 
regarding use of the world’s resources, though still weak, are more developed today than they 
were a hundred years ago, and can no longer be ignored.  In sum, the circumstances giving rise 
to “rule Britania” no longer prevail, either on the high seas or in outer space.  New guiding 
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A New Approach to Rulemaking for Outer Space 
 
Does a Superpower Need Rules?   The Advantages of Legal Regimes 
 
Why should a superpower need rules___especially if is the only superpower?  Actors 
create rules for several reasons:  rules facilitate cooperation, coordinate action, stabilize 
expectations about the future, and help actors realize their interests and achieve their goals in the 
context of an interdependent world.  It is often argued that weak states have a stronger preference 
for rules—“rules are the last refuge of the weak”—because rules constrain the power of the 
strong.  The strong can get what they want through the exertion of power and coercion of weaker 
actors, while the weak must rely on the protection of the law.  In fact, even hegemonic states find 
significant advantages___for both “soft” and “hard” power reasons___in having rules, and 
therefore support rules that promote their interests.242  
 
Rules or regimes can come into being in a number of ways.  They can be imposed 
through coercion or power, they can be negotiated, or they can arise spontaneously (e.g. in the 
manner of customary law).243  The trend today is much more toward negotiated international law.  
In recent years, NGOs and private actors (e.g., firms) have played a much greater role in the 
creation of rules, a development relevant to outer space issue.244  There has also been a trend 
toward “soft law,” politically but not legally binding agreements, an area of lawmaking in which 
nonstate actors can participate. 
 
 Empirically, international law has traditionally reflected the interests of the dominant 
powers.  For example, the United States got its way most of the time in the negotiations over the 
post_ WWII economic order. In the case of the law of the sea, after holding out for more than a 
decade, the United States was able to secure substantial revisions of the deep seabed mining 
provisions of the 1982 convention even after it had entered into force.  On the basis of this, in 
1994, the Clinton administration announced its intention to adhere, and sent it to the Senate 
where Jesse Helms, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, blocked further action on 
it.246  Other industrialized countries, including Britain, France, Japan, Canada and the USSR, 
also objected to aspects of the deep seabed mining provisions, however, and largely supported 
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the changes pushed by the United States.  They delayed their ratifications until recently.247  
Finally, almost single-handedly, the United States was able to keep a firm commitment to 
reductions of carbon dioxide emissions out of the Framework Convention on Climate change in 
Rio in 1992.248   
 
However, hegemonic rulemaking is being nibbled away.  As noted earlier, principles of 
equity, accountability and fairness are increasingly accepted principles of international law. 
Additionally, although power remains important, it is increasingly being diffused by more 
participatory, multilateral decisionmaking structures. For example, the creation of the World 
Trade Organization significantly democratizes rulemaking in international trade.  The 
international treatymaking process in general leaves a good deal of room for accommodating 
divergent interests.  Multilateral negotiating forums provide opportunities for weaker states to 
organize blocking coalitions.  In UNCLOS III, the caucus of “land-locked and geographically 
disadvantaged states,” which included such unlikely colleagues as Hungary, Switzerland, 
Austria, Uganda, Nepal and Bolivia, developed a crucial strategic position.  The Association of 
Small Island States, chaired by Vanuatu, played a similar role in the global climate negotiations.  
The LOS treaty received the requisite number of ratifications to enter into force in 1994, before 
most of the major powers had ratified it, a factor encouraging the United States to reconsider its 
position on the treaty.  The 1997 landmines ban was achieved over the objections of the United 
States.  It currently appears that the majority of states who support the establishment of legal 
commitments under the Kyoto accord on global warming may seek to proceed without the 
United States. 
 
The trend toward multilateral rulemaking might suggest that rules established on the basis 
of principle and equity are more efficient and enduring than rules imposed by power.  The issue 
is complex, however.  On the one hand, rules imposed by power presumably enjoy the support of 
the dominant actors and therefore are probably fairly enduring and stable. Rules established on 
the basis of principle and equity presumably entail negotiations among a large group of actors 
with diverse interests.  The outcome reflects some lowest common denominator and therefore 
leads to vaguer and more incoherent rules, which are inherently unstable over the long haul.249  
This is often the fate of many large multilateral negotiations, especially in the initial phases of 
negotiation on an issue. 
 
However, most analyses in the literature suggest that pure hegemony is also inefficient.  
The hegemon may induce obedience through the exercise of coercive power, but it is 
exceedingly costly to rule solely by coercion.  Norms and rules offer one way to reduce costs, so 
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they are prominent even in hegemonic systems.  But the rule structure will have this effect 
only if it is to some extent truly normative, and not just a disguise for willful command.  Thus 
even the hegemon will find itself seeking attributes of legitimacy to make the rule system 
work.250  In reality, enduring and viable legal regimes are neither purely power-based nor can 
they entirely ignore power in favor of pure equity.  To be both legitimate and enduring, they 
must recognize considerations of both power and equity. 
 
The United States and the Law of the Sea Treaty 
 
The Bush administration’s decision in November 2001 to adhere to the LOS Treaty 
provides a good example of the consequences of interdependence and how even hegemonic 
states find it useful to support rules.  This was a surprising decision given the Bush 
administration’s well-known skepticism of international law and multilateral treaties in general.  
On November 27, 2001, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN Economic and Social Council 
announced that the treaty met “U.S. national security, economic and environmental interests,” 
and informed the council that President Bush supported U.S. accession to the treaty, nineteen 
years after it had been negotiated and seven years after it had gone into effect.251   
 
Several factors appear to be behind this decision.  First, the treaty had strong support 
from the Navy and oil, mining, shipping and fishing industries, as well as environmentalists and 
marine scientists.  U.S. Navy officials argued in favor of it on the grounds that it would secure 
the rights of navigation that would allow U.S. naval forces to transit quickly to military 
theaters.257  Second, U.S. acceptance of the treaty allows it to participate in several institutions 
created by the treaty, and thereby exert more influence on ocean-related commissions and 
tribunals.  The most important of these is the Commission on the Limitations of the Continental 
Shelf, the body responsible for establishing a secure regime for exploitation of oil and other non-
living resources on the continental shelf.  The treaty provides the only recognized means of 
gaining authority over this area.  The United States has a strong interest in this commission since 
it seeks to extend its continental shelf claim beyond 200 miles in the Bering Sea.  Other 
important treaty institutions include the dispute resolution tribunals and the International Seabed 
Authority.  U.S. nationals can only participate in these institutions if the United States is a 
member of the treaty.258  
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Additionally, the diplomatic confrontation between the United States and China in 
early 2001 following overflight of the Chinese exclusive economic zone by a U.S. surveillance 
plane may have impressed upon the Bush administration the value of the substantive principles 
and concepts of the treaty.260  The U.S. position that this overflight was lawful would have been 
considerably strengthened if the United States had been able to invoke Article 58 of the treaty, 
which covers such incidents. China, of course, had already accepted the LOS Convention, as 
have 141 other nations.  Last, but not least, U.S. membership in the LOS treaty provides the 
opportunity to influence the evolution of this agreement through its interpretation by state 
practice.  Being on the outside, looking in, inhibits that possibility. 
 
Given SPACECOM’s narrow interpretation of U.S. interests in space and dismissive 
attitude toward international law, the U.S. military’s strong support for the LOS treaty is worth 
noting. The Pentagon’s 1998 annual report to Congress stated that “the Department of Defense 
strongly supports U.S. accession” to the LOS convention.  It explained that “a stable legal regime 
for the world’s oceans that recognizes traditional navigational rights and freedoms is essential to 
U.S. national security.” A global power, regularly moving military forces around the world, 
depends on mobility and freedom of navigation.  Worldwide acceptance of the treaty  “is the best 
way to ensure these rights are recognized, respected, and given the force of written law.”263  In 
the Pentagon’s view, reliance on customary law would serve U.S. interests much less effectively.  
The Convention was preferable because “it confirms traditional high seas freedoms of navigation 
and overflight; it details passage rights through international straits; and it reduces prospects for 
disagreements with coastal states during operations.”264   
 
These provisions are crucial for the Navy, which is currently restricted from routinely operating 
in many perceived strategic areas due to excessive maritime claims. Several countries—including China, 
India, Pakistan and North Korea—require prior notice or permission for the innocent passage of warships 
within twelve nautical miles of their coastlines, and others require notice before passing through the EEZ.  
The Navy is currently forced to rely on bilateral and multilateral agreements with local governments to 
pass through such areas.  The LOS treaty will minimize the need for these confusing, overlapping, and 
sometimes undependable agreements.  Under the treaty, all foreign commercial and military vessels are 
allowed innocent passage through sea lanes, coastal waters and EEZs.265  
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Supporters of space weapons point to the role of strong U.S. naval forces in keeping 
the sea lanes open and enforcing freedom of the seas as a model for a similar U.S. policy in 
space. Yet the Navy itself has concluded that a stable international legal regime provides a less 
costly and dangerous way to ensure freedom of the seas than sole reliance on unilateral 
“enforcement” through its Freedom of Navigation Program (FON).  In this policy, the Navy 
deliberately challenges, through diplomatic protests and assertive fleet operations, what it sees to 
be excessive coastal claims over the oceans.  The Navy has found these unilateral demonstrations 
of resolve increasingly risky as they were eliciting strong and potentially dangerous reactions 
from other states.266  They were also stretching the Navy thin, and other nations were reluctant to 
join in FON operations.  The FON program was thus becoming physically, politically, and 
financially costly for the Navy.  In the Navy’s view, the LOS Treaty, by reducing the number of 
coastal state claims and pressure on the Navy to act unilaterally, provides a more cost-effective 
and reliable means of promoting U.S. interests. As the Pentagon argued, “relying solely on 
diplomatic and operational challenges is less desirable than establishment, through the 
Convention, of accepted norms of behavior.”267 
 
In short, the Bush administration calculated that the LOS treaty would advance U.S. 
interests by stabilizing rights and responsibilities regarding ocean activities, and that the United 
States would be better off inside rather than outside it.  Such developments in multilateral 
decisionmaking are the result of increasing recognition that rules are more stable and efficient 
when stakeholders, both powerful and weak, are involved in the rulemaking process. 
 
An “LOS Treaty” for Outer Space 
 
Space, like the oceans, provides for a combination of military and civilian uses.  If the 
United States were to reason from this example and support an LOS treaty equivalent for space, 
what components already exist, and what would have to be created?  Those that currently exist 
include a basic set of general principles including treating space as a commons, preserving it for 
peaceful purposes, maintaining freedom of access and use, and promoting responsibility and 
cooperation in its use for the benefit of all.  Space is the “province of all mankind,” and states are 
obliged to defer to the international community’s interests in space, and to share the benefits of 
space.268  At the level of rhetoric, at least, many of the basic principles are in place. 
 
Important elements are lacking, however, and would have to be created.  First, clear 
definitions of these principles and specific guidelines for operationalizing them in practice are 
needed.  As I noted earlier, the LOS treaty takes significant steps in these directions with respect 
to the oceans, but still falls short especially in the security area.  A space regime will need to go 
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further.  Second, old analogies, such as the freedom of the seas, no longer suffice, and need to 
be replaced with several new organizing principles:  comprehensive security, equal protection in 
space, and equity in access to space.  Here, the LOS model needs to be updated.  Third, a better 
articulated space regime will need more effective, collective decisionmaking processes, and 
mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance with the rules.  Here, the LOS treaty provides a 
good model (the LOS process, for example, resulted in new decisionmaking tribunals such as for 
the Continental shelf and deep seabed mining regime, and a dispute resolution mechanism with 
“teeth”).  Finally, a specific political process for negotiating a more comprehensive regime will 
be needed.  Here, the LOS treaty provides one of several possible models, though perhaps the 




A more elaborated regime for space will require a shift away from an operational regime 
based largely on a “freedom of the seas” analogy and deterrence-based notions of security to one 
based on principles of comprehensive security, equal protection in space, and equity in access to 
space resources.  A broader definition of security would go beyond a purely military approach to 
security to include resource and environmental issues, and economic and development concerns.  
Such an approach is crucial for space, with its transnational and planetary effects.  Military, 
environmental and economic issues are inherently linked in space.  Testing ASAT weapons in 
space, for example, could produce thousands of pieces of space debris, which could make it 
much riskier to put either commercial or military satellites into low-earth orbits.269  Protecting 
space from environmental damage will be central to continuing enjoyment of its economic and 
security benefits.  As the 1995 Commission on Global Governance stated, “global security must 
be broadened from its traditional focus on the security of states to include the security of peoples 
and the planet.”270  
 
An effective operational regime for space will also need to reflect principles of 
reassurance rather than threat and deterrence.  It will need to address the issue of the uneven 
distribution of security and protection among states, especially with respect to space assets.  The 
United States possesses hugely asymmetrical capabilities to wage war and defend itself and its 
allies.  But these tremendous capabilities, against which other states possess little defense, 
increase the vulnerability of others and create incentives for asymmetric warfare.  Most 
significantly, vast changes in the nature of threats today make deterrence a much less relevant 
approach to security than in the past.  In an era of globalization where weapons proliferation, 
terrorism, and unconventional warfare, not attack by another state, pose the major security 
threats, traditional concepts of deterrence and confrontational force postures are increasingly 
                                                     
269Links between the environment and military activities include environmental contamination from 
weapons production and development, the environmental consequences of warfare, and environmental degradation 
as a cause of conflict.  Eric K. Stern, “The Case for Comprehensive Security,” in Daniel Deudney and Richard A. 
Matthew, eds., Contested Grounds:  Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics (Albany:  State 
University of New York, 1999), pp. 135-38.  Jessica T. Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68 
(1989). 




dysfunctional and even counterproductive.271 Deterrence policies (including missile defense, 
which, contrary to claims of its supporters, does not eliminate deterrence) exacerbate suspicion 
and hostility, create incentives for arms races, and undermine crisis stability. Instead, policies for 
space should emphasize principles of common security and reassurance rather than national 
security and deterrence.  Most nations would like guarantees that space will not be used against 
them.  The long-term stability of the space regime depends on its being organized as a regime of 
collective protection—of both states and assets—rather than as a regime of nationally organized 
threat and deterrence.     
 
Finally, principles of equity will also need to be central elements of an elaborated space 
regime. At the time the Outer Space Treaty was negotiated, the space powers accepted the 
“province of all mankind” concept “on the general assumption that it will not really burden their 
programs and, in any case, that they themselves will determine unilaterally how it is to be 
implemented.”272  Technically, the “province of all mankind” does not mean the same thing as 
the “common heritage of mankind,” which formally applies to the Moon only.  The “province of 
all mankind” is a relatively general principle that says that all nations have the nonexclusive right 
to use space.  The notion of common heritage (CH) is a more specific principle (although with 
uncertain scope) that refers to the legal status of property rights.  It implies five things:  1) that a 
resource can be used but not owned, 2) that the use of the commons will be managed by an 
international authority, 3) active sharing of benefits, 4) reservation of the commons for peaceful 
purposes, and 5) reservation for future generations.273   
 
Because of the exhausting controversy over the CH principle during the seabed 
negotiations, and few ratifications of the Moon Treaty, the international community is unlikely to 
formally extend the CH principle to all of space any time soon, although many developing 
countries and environmental law experts would support this.274  Yet it remains a politically 
important and relevant concept, especially in its “new and improved” 1994 interpretation.  In the 
renegotiated deep seabed mining regime, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) was 
restructured along market lines, allowing private economic activity in accordance with market 
principles including the transfer of technology through the open market on commercial terms, 
and “chambered” voting.  The latter ensures that the United States and two other industrialized 
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states can make up a blocking vote in the ISA Council.275 Under this new interpretation, the 
concept was quite acceptable to the western states.  Indeed, despite the conflict over the principle 
in the LOS treaty negotiations, the principle itself was never rejected, even by the United States 
and other western countries dissatisfied with the treaty’s provisions for the deep seabed mining 
authority.  The dispute was over how to apply it.  No government denied the need to implement 
the CH principle in seabed activities through a global redistributive scheme.  Rather, some states 
asserted that this could be achieved more effectively by private enterprise than by encumbering 
international management.276 
 
In the wake of the revised seabed agreement, both the status and the scope of the CH 
principle today remain uncertain.  It remains a highly contested and controversial legal concept.  
Legal scholars, environmental advocates and states have variously proclaimed its application 
more broadly to meteors, the geostationary orbit, the radio-frequency spectrum, solar energy, 
low-earth orbits, various environmental resources such as endangered species, genetic resources, 
tropical rain forests, the high seas, the atmosphere, all food resources, marine living resources 
and cultural heritages.277  This suggests that there is no particular understanding that the concept 
is reserved only for mineral extraction.  Indeed, advocates of the concept saw its application to 
seabed mining as merely the first step in what should eventually become a broad application to 
the global commons, leading to a revolution in environmental management.  Were the CH 
concept applied to space, it could in principle be applied to the economic benefits of all space 
activities, not simply resource extraction from celestial bodies. 
 
So far, although no government has rejected the CH principle in the abstract, 
governments have not exhibited any willingness to accept it as a mandatory legal obligation for 
activities in common areas.  The majority of legal writers hold that it is primarily a reflection of a 
political aspiration and a moral commitment, and that it does not represent substantive 
international law.  At the same time, it does possess an “emerging normative quality.”278  It has 
helped to promote notions of stewardship and the sharing of benefits that are now widely 
accepted as essential to the legitimacy of any global commons management system.  Although 
the United States objected to many of the Moon Treaty’s CH provisions as being too 
“socialistic,” it indicated throughout the negotiations that it was not opposed to the basic idea of 
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sharing benefits with the Third World, and to redistributing a small percentage of its wealth. 
However, one consequence of the 1994 revised seabed agreement is that the operational 
interpretation of any application of the CH concept today will be informed by a liberal market 
philosophy rather than by the command economy-style redistributive aspirations of the 1970s-era 
demands for a New International Economic Order that shaped the original interpretation of the 
CH principle.  Principles of efficiency and practicality will limit aspirations for redistribution and 
justice.  
 
In sum, although the phrase “common heritage of mankind” itself is unlikely to make it 
into an elaborated space regime, its component elements reflect basic principles of equity, 
accountability and fairness in the use of resources that will be essential elements of a more 
specified regime for space.  The rest of the world is directly concerned and should have a say in 
the options that are chosen for space projects and in the distribution of the benefits of space. In 
pursuit of the common benefit, the members of the international community must be able to 
determine the conditions under which the exploitation or use of the resources is to take place.  At 
minimum, the “peaceful uses” and “province of all mankind” principles imply that freedom of 
use is not unlimited, especially for warfare.  More broadly, the “province of all mankind” could 
be expanded to incorporate a notion of sustainable development.279  At any rate, the rules of 
space will need to reflect a global, rather than national, public interest, and not merely the 
interests of a few spacefaring governments and corporations.   
 
  Thus an elaborated regime for space will need to be supplemented by principles of 
equity and new principles of security.  However, these principles will need to be given content 
through specific operational rules. This will entail, in particular, setting clearer limits on the 
notion of freedom of exploration and use, and on “peaceful purposes.”   
 
New Rules:  Operationalizing Peaceful Purposes 
 
The controversy over the term “peaceful purposes” as regards outer space reflects 
different conclusions about how to manage military competition.  At one end of the spectrum, 
advocates of “peace through strength” perspectives, such as SPACECOM, believe security is 
best achieved through self-help and unilateral reliance on a posture of overwhelming military 
force to deter challenges in advance.  At the other end of the spectrum, advocates of 
demilitarization believe security is best advanced by eliminating all forms of military activity 
from space.  In the middle, advocates of security through mutual deterrence and arms control 
divide military activities into “destabilizing” and “stabilizing” activities.  In this view, stabilizing 
military activity (such as monitoring of arms control agreements) should be continued while 
developing new weapons technologies that upset the strategic balance should be avoided. 280 
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The majority of the international community clearly views weaponization of space as 
inconsistent with “peaceful purposes.”  This leaves two other possible interpretations of 
“peaceful purposes”:  total demilitarization, or some form of “space sanctuary,” understood as a 
ban on weapons in space and possibly constraints on other military activities.  
 
Total demilitarization.  This would follow the model of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty to 
prohibit military involvement in space altogether.  It would have the virtue of a strong 
prohibition on arms in space and greater logical clarity.  Advocates of this position charge that 
any ban limited to weapons rather than including all military activities will have the effect of 
legitimizing the military use of near-earth space.  However, as Rebecca Johnson has noted, the 
challenge of this position is that since passive military activities are already carried out in space, 
a total demilitarization of space would be a radical step and would probably depend on a far-
reaching and deeper demilitarization of international relations. Further, the difficulty of 
distinguishing between civilian and military uses of satellites would make monitoring this 
difficult.  While a majority of the satellites in space do have a military purpose, many also serve 
as “national technical means” and therefore play an important role in monitoring and verification 
of arms control and nonproliferation agreements, an important stabilizing effect.281  Just about 
any use of space can be useful for military purposes, including weather, navigation, 
communications and remote sensing. 
 
For the foreseeable future, a regime promoting a purely nonmilitary approach to outer 
space would likely be purely aspirational, lacking clear definitions or compliance measures, 
since the dominant spacepowers are unlikely to agree to a specified regime that eliminated 
passive military activities.  Thus such a regime may have little effect on the activities of the 
spacepowers, leading to what many non-spacefaring nations would perceive as a discriminatory 
regime.282  Though it may remain the aspiration of some groups of states, total demilitarization 
of space appears an unlikely possibility. 
 
Space sanctuary.  It is likely___indeed almost inevitable___that “non-aggressive” (rather 
than “nonmilitary”) will continue to be the operating interpretation of “peaceful purposes.”  Even 
so, agreement will still be needed on what counts as “non-aggressive” military activity.  The 
likely option is a regime that recognizes some role for the military use of space but not its 
weaponization.  This view, often referred to as “space sanctuary,” would prohibit the testing and 
deployment of weapons in space, as well as ASAT weapons deployed on Earth.283  It draws on 
the 45-year tradition among the spacepowers of refraining from stationing weapons in space. 
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Despite the lack of progress on arms control in space since the 1950s, the most remarkable 
feature of the current regime for space has been this tradition of restraint in weaponizing space.  
According to Theresa Hitchens, this “unspoken pact” or “gentlemen’s agreement” has 
“penetrated the international psyche so deeply” that most countries, including the two 
superpower rivals during the Cold War, also refrained from deploying earth-based weapons that 
could shoot down satellites (although they have pursued development of such weapons).284   
 
Hitchens may overstate the robustness of this tradition, given the strong elements of 
contingency in its origins.  Nevertheless, it has become a widely supported norm of the 
international community.  It thus provides an important precedent for developing a more 
formalized notion of space sanctuary.   
 
What accounts for the lack of an arms race in space so far?  Explanations emphasize a set 
of military, technical, political, organizational, and ideational factors.  According to Paul Stares, 
the explanation lies in the “convergence of national interests, military disincentives and technical 
constraints, which were buttressed at important times by formal agreements.”285  U.S. 
policymakers recognized that space weapons offered few military advantages.  They faced 
serious technical constraints, and also wanted to project a “peaceful” image of the U.S. space 
program.  Organizational factors reinforced these considerations, as the Air Force interest in 
space declined for a lengthy period in the 1960s and 1970s.  Other explanations emphasize the 
common interest of the superpowers in avoiding an ASAT race.  Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union recognized the mutual benefits of reconnaissance satellites and reached a “tacit” 
agreement to refrain from developing weapons to counter them. Satellites provided mutual 
reassurance and thus strengthened the system of stable nuclear deterrence.286  As Stares 
emphasizes, the practice of keeping space free of weapons has been reinforced over the years by 
formal agreements (e.g. the 1963 UN resolution banning weapons of mass destruction from 
space, later codified in the Outer Space Treaty; and the ABM treaty).  The international 
community has repeatedly reaffirmed support for the nonweaponization norm in numerous UN 
resolutions and diplomatic statements. 
 
Today, some of these conditions no longer hold.  Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, 
changes have occurred mainly on the organizational and policy, not the technical, side.  The Air 
                                                     
284 Theresa Hitchens, “Rushing to Weaponize the Final Frontier,”  Arms Control Today (September  2001). 
285 Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space:  U.S. Policy, 1945-1984 ( Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 
1985), p. 238. 




Force has rediscovered a major organizational interest in space.287  The continued U.S. 
commitment to projecting a peaceful image in space is in serious doubt, especially after U.S. 
withdrawal from the ABM treaty.  Technical and strategic constraints have changed much less 
than imagined, however. While U.S. space technological capabilities have advanced 
significantly, serious technical constraints on space weapons remain.  Additionally, the military 
advantages of space weapons remain unclear.  Finally, given the international community’s 
increasing use of space, the common interest in avoiding an arms race in space is even stronger 
today.  For the United States, the strategic disadvantages of an ASAT race are even more acute 
than in the past because of the greater U.S. dependence on space today.  Thus many of the 
technical, military and strategic factors encouraging a nonweaponization tradition continue to 
hold today. 
 
Rules for a Space Sanctuary Regime 
 
 A more elaborated operational regime for a space sanctuary could begin with two basic 
rules:  no weapons in space, and no interference with space assets.  These would be insufficient 
to sustain an operational sanctuary regime, however, and would need to be accompanied by two 
additional sets of rules:  rules defining permissible limits on military activities in space, 
especially with regard to observation and sensing, and rules allocating use of space among 
various uses (economic, scientific, military) and various users.   
 
Since there are no weapons in space today, one obvious limit will be to prohibit weapons 
based in space.  No nation is likely to object to ICBM trajectories through space, thus these 
would be permitted.  However, U.S. missile defenses, under the space sanctuary rules that I am 
suggesting, would not include weapons based in space.  Also prohibited would be the testing and 
deployment of earth-based and air-based ASAT weapons, although verification of such an 
agreement will be difficult because of the residual ASAT capabilities of missile defenses.  An 
alternative strategy would be to ban weapons from higher orbits (above 500 miles).  This would 
permit attacking ballistic missiles traveling through (near-earth) space but would forbid shooting 
from space or attacking permanent objects in space.288  
 
In addition to the ban on deploying weapons in space, a second core rule of the regime 
would be a prohibition on interference with space assets.  Assets in space are highly vulnerable, 
and any space security regime will need to incorporate a strong normative prohibition against 
interfering with them, or threatening to do so.  Superpower arms control agreements, including 
the ABM, SALT and START treaties, contained provisions prohibiting interference with 
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“national technical means,” each side’s satellite monitoring capabilities.  This rule should be 
generalized to all space assets.  It would guarantee immunity to satellites, installations and their 
components in space that perform “peaceful” and security functions including agreed-upon 
military support activities. Interference with space assets would be viewed as aggression, and 
violations would incur strong sanctions or penalties.  Such a rule would have the virtue of clarity, 
simplicity and coherence.  Most states would have a strong interest in having their space assets 
immune from attack.  Reciprocity and the threat of retaliation would help to sustain the rule.  
Since such a rule would be in the greatest interest of states heavily dependent on space assets, 
powerful states will have an interest in supporting it.  Obviously, there may be pressure to violate 
it in time of crisis.  While such a rule could certainly not prevent a state determined to violate it 
from doing so, it would make attack upon a space asset a very serious matter, with possibly 
severe consequences to follow. 
 
While these two rules—nonweaponization and noninterference___might form the core of a 
space sanctuary regime, a noninterference rule (e.g. freedom of the seas) is easily abused as 
freedom to disregard the interests of others.  It thus requires clear agreed-upon limits on the 
activities entitled to enjoy “noninterference.”  In space, this means clear rules on the limits of 
permissible military support activities, which are currently unconstrained.  The central issue here 
is the role of satellites in supporting earth-based weapons.  Satellites are assuming an ever-
growing role in the application of weapons based on earth.  Some of their uses as “gunsights in 
space,” such as identification and location of targets for long-range precision attack, missile 
guidance, and conduct of offensive ground operations, are arguably highly aggressive.  These 
roles will increase once states master the techniques for tracking moving objects on earth from 
space.  Thus space could be used to employ many weapons systems not based in space, including 
nuclear and conventional strategic strike missions.289   
 
Defenders of such activities argue that the use of satellites for precise target acquisition 
has reduced human suffering in warfare.290  This may be true at some level, but this benefit risks 
being overwhelmed by the possible extension of the strategic threat to space and the consequent 
collapse of global strategic stability.  States are also currently free to use measures such as 
camouflage and deception to conceal sensitive military activities in space.  There are also no 
limits on the number of objects a state may launch into space.  The permissibility of launching a 
large number of decoys could be questioned at some point in the future.  Where all these 
activities cross the line into “non-peaceful” remains undefined.   
 
The need for clarification is becoming urgent because of conflicting interpretations of the 
current legal regime.  The United States maintains that the current right to transit space is 
customary (thus permitting any activities that are not expressly prohibited).291   China rejects this 
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view, arguing that the right to transit space is given by the Outer Space Treaty, and is therefore 
contingent on being “peaceful.” China has made clear that its interpretation of what counts as 
peaceful will be revised if the United States moves weaponry into space.  In that event, China 
will likely take a much narrower view of what is permitted in the way of military support 
activities.  The United States has until now enjoyed great latitude in this area, but all these 
activities will be called into question if the United States moves weaponry into space and 
conflicts with China come to a head.  China has hinted that it is willing to allow fairly 
sophisticated military support in exchange for some kind of restraint on space weapons.292 
 
Thus it is likely that we will need some rules on the limits of sensing and observation in 
support of military activities.  They will be designed to reassure others that space surveillance 
practices used to verify compliance with treaties are not part of a clandestine ABM or espionage 
effort.  Other states, especially Russia and China, will need reassurance that the United States is 
not seeking space capabilities in order to launch a disarming first strike, and that U.S. ABM 
deployments, precision-strike, and surveillance capabilities are not aimed at them.  Such rules 
will also be designed to prevent the surreptitious weaponization of space, as well as the 
domination of space by military activities at the expense of other uses.  This may entail some 
form of cooperative monitoring effort and joint early warning of missile launches.  
 
In addition to constraints on military support, the international community will probably 
also need to devise rules for the distribution and allocation of commercial sensing data, 
especially in times of crisis.  While states can regulate and control their own commercial remote 
sensing industry (if they have one), they have no such control over those of other states.  This 
creates a strong incentive to negotiate rules to provide for the distribution of data in times of 
crisis.293 Additionally, there will also likely need to be rules limiting deception and camouflage 
in space, and regulating the number of objects a state may launch into space.   
 
To ensure compliance with the rules, an effective operational regime for space will need 
a system of monitoring, verification and enforcement.  To the extent possible, it should 
emphasize a compliance rather than a deterrence approach to rule enforcement.   
 
A compliance regime restricts opportunities to violate the rules instead of making choice 
of violation less attractive.294  It involves rules, monitoring and enforcement procedures aimed to 
prevent violations by, for example, requiring equipment with certain specifications that makes 
violating the rules unlikely.  Compliance is built into technical capabilities or procedures in a 
way that makes monitoring relatively transparent.  For example, requiring ships to have certain 
kinds of hulls for pollution control, or spacecraft to have certain physical characteristics (non-
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hardening) makes it difficult to violate certain rules, and easier to detect possible violations.  In 
effect, compliance with the regime is coerced.   
 
In contrast, deterrence regimes aim to deter violations through penalties or sanctions.  
This mechanism of enforcement is also important, but violations under this scheme are often 
harder to detect.  A compliance approach will be difficult in space because of the dual-use nature 
of much of the technology.   
 
Finally, an operating regime for space will need to be built around norms and processes 
of transparency.  Transparency measures are an important mechanism of both reassurance and 
verification when linked to cooperative obligations.295  Transparency measures serve to 
demonstrate peaceful intent, good faith, and ongoing compliance with the rules.  Such measures 
would involve the systematic exchange of relevant information on space activities, including 
measures to provide generally available information as well as other measures for the exchange 
of more sensitive information under agreed conditions for access and use.    
 
One example would be the development of an on-site prelaunch verification regime.  This 
could build on the UN Registration Convention, which is intended to be a transparency 
mechanism but is currently not very demanding.  It could be strengthened to provide details 
about the nature and function of the spacecraft as well as about “transparency of use,” such as 
tracking space objects, monitoring telemetry, and observation.  Parameters such as radiation 
hardening, weight, power, nature of telemetry, satellite services, and international participation 
could be used as additional elements to categorize uses.  Lack of data or inadequate compliance 
with these aspects would be an indicator of suspicious use.296  For this to qualify as true 
verification, it would have to go beyond “transparency without obligation.”  The information 
reported or collected about the various parameters would have to reflect agreement about how 
each characteristic related to acceptable or prohibited activities.297 Other transparency 
mechanisms could include advance notification of launches with expected orbital parameters, 
minimum separation distances between spacecraft, inspection procedures, and consultative 
mechanisms to reduce misperceptions arising from ambiguous activities or accidents in space.  
One useful multilateral step would be to provide warning to any interested state of the launching 
of rockets anywhere in the world.298 
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 These various sets of rules would obviously need greater specification, and their 
technical details would have to be worked out.  However, they might provide the core of a more 
formalized space sanctuary regime. 
   
New Processes and Institutions 
 
Three alternative models for creation of a more elaborated space regime are provided by 
1) the UNCLOS III approach to the law of the sea, 2) the “framework-protocol” approach of 
several recent environmental treaties, and 3) the “Ottawa process” approach of the landmines 
campaign.  Each has its strengths and weaknesses. The UNCLOS III model suggests an 
enormous, comprehensive effort that results in a massive, very detailed and complex regulatory 
agreement that is in effect a kind of “constitution” for space.299  It specifies very detailed 
operational rules and sets up new decisionmaking, monitoring and dispute resolution structures.  
This approach would produce the kind of detailed operating regime needed for space.  But it 
would require difficult, highly complex and detailed negotiations over an extended period.  For 
such a massive effort to be successful, it would require a major political commitment to the 
process and leadership on the part of the dominant actors.  Although some states might be 
interested, the United States, which played a major leadership role in the UNCLOS negotiations, 
shows no comparable interest in a similar negotiation process for space at this time. 
 
In contrast, the framework-protocol approach is a more incremental process.  As 
illustrated by the Ozone Treaty and the Kyoto accord on global warming, a framework 
convention typically establishes a structure for further cooperation among the parties through 
monitoring and implementation procedures, exchanging data, and facilitating scientific research, 
while protocols provide for greater specificity in complex regulation.  This permits a treaty 
embodying general principles to come into force and a cooperative regime to get under way 
where the consensus necessary for a more detailed agreement is lacking.  This approach 
emphasizes common interests and common benefits.  It emphasizes compliance, implementation 
and dispute avoidance, rather than “breach”, “dispute settlement,” and “compulsory 
jurisdiction.”300  It focuses on transparency and capacity-building as ways to induce compliance.  
The advantage of this approach is that it allows the process of cooperation to move forward even 
while the endpoint remains out of sight.  The disadvantages of this approach for space, as 
illustrated by the grimly slow progress of the Kyoto accord, is that the process may become 
stalled at the framework level if states cannot agree on operational “solutions,” and thus 
agreement on detailed operating rules is repeatedly put off for the future—a risky situation for 
space.  
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A third approach is an “Ottawa-process.”  This is based on the model of the landmines 
campaign, whereby civil society and a few conscientious states led the way in achieving a 
worldwide ban on landmines.  The virtue of this process is that it takes the process of creating 
new norms out of the exclusive hands of states.  It would involve mobilizing coalitions of NGOs 
and countries and industries with significant commercial interests in non-military uses of 
space.301  Most defense companies, which mount powerful lobbies in the United States, have a 
vested interest in weaponizing space, and thus may be hard to interest in this process.  Since the 
landmines campaign, the United States has sought to avoid circumstances that might lead to 
other Ottawa-type processes outside the regular UN negotiating fora (such as for small arms), 
and would be expected to resist such a process for space.  China and others would not be 
enthusiastic about NGO participation.  At one level, of course, there is nothing to stop coalitions 
of NGOs and interested states from getting such a process going, since they do not need 
anyone’s permission to do so.  However, the result could be meaningless unless the United 
States, the 800_pound gorilla in space, agrees to go along with the results.   
 
Given the current distribution of power and interests in space, an UNCLOS III-type 
process seems unlikely at this point.  The creation of a more specified regime for space will more 
likely entail some combination of a framework approach and an Ottawa process.  As long as the 
United States continues to resist negotiations on space weapons, interested states, NGOs, 
commercial enterprises and other parties may simply have to move forward in alternative fora 
with an “agenda politics” approach to the creation of new principles and norms for space.  It is 
important to establish the relevant “framework” as soon as possible – the principles of 
comprehensive security, equal protection in space, and equity, and the basic rules of 
restraint___nonweaponization, noninterference, and defined limits on activities.  These new 
norms can begin to orient both political activity and activities in space.  Because the United 
States has multiple interests in space, it is not unreasonable to think that it will eventually 




The challenge the international community faces in space today is the imminent collapse 
of a 45-year tradition of restraint in regard to military activities in space.  U.S. plans for “global 
engagement” represent the abandonment of any concept of restraint in favor of a regime of 
unilateral assertion of power, largely in disregard of the interests of others. If pursued, such a 
strategy will undermine the fragile existing legal order in space widely supported by the rest of 
the world.  This will place in jeopardy not only the interests of other nations in space, but the 
multiple interests there of the United States itself. 
  
Because of the threat posed by this development, it is clear that, one way or another, a 
new regime for space will emerge.  The existing regime cannot survive in its current form in the 
face of the new challenges.  Either it will be transformed by agreement into a more elaborated 
                                                     





operating regime that balances the various interests in space on the basis of new guiding 
principles and norms, or it will be transformed by default into a regime of power and an arena of 
military competition dominated by the United States.  
 
What are the prospects for a nonweaponization regime for space?  It is obvious that no 
viable legal regime for space can be established without the agreement of the major space 
powers.  On the other hand, it is equally obvious that a regime that neglected the needs of others 
would be rejected by subsequent space-active countries.  Today, there are more spacefaring 
countries that are in a position to influence the issue than there were in the 1960s and 1970s.  
This provides some reason for optimism.  What led to the dramatic changes in ocean law was 
that the multitude of developing states realized that, although they could not match the great 
powers in long distance fleets and technology, they could thwart their freedom of movement by 
extending jurisdictional claims into the oceans.  Likewise in space, other states will not be able to 
match the United States in capabilities, but they can thwart U.S. freedom of action through 
various kinds of interference, such as jamming satellite signals. This creates a strong incentive 
for the United States to negotiate clear rules of behavior that will preserve its broad interests in 
space. 
 
Today the freedom of the seas principle is increasingly dysfunctional, but hegemony need 
not be.  The United States should use its power and position to support the creation of an 
operational regime for space based on the rule of law, rather than pursue a short-sighted policy of 
competition in national dominance there.  Security in space will be more effectively achieved 
through a rule-based regime than through the deployment of destabilizing weapons systems. The 
rest of the world is not rushing to weaponize space, and instead appears ready to follow the U.S. 
lead in devising new rules for its effective management.  In the long run, the best way to protect 
U.S. commercial, scientific and security interests in space will be through the stability of the rule 
of law, rather than through unilateral assertions of military power.   The United States should 
take the lead in promoting the transition to a regime of mutual restraint and benefit in space.  
 
 
